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ABSTRACT
This paper summarizes the main lessons learned from Law and Employment: Lessons from Latin
America and the Caribbean, a forthcoming NBER book. It places Latin American economies and
economic policies in a world context. The paper quantifies the cost of regulation in Latin America
and OECD Europe and discusses the origin of regulation. It shows the fragility of time series data
analyses of the sort widely used to analyze the impact of regulation in OECD Europe and the
benefits of using microdata data. The evidence shows that regulation reduces labor market
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1. Introduction 
This book uses microdata from diverse Latin American and Caribbean countries to 
investigate the impact of regulation on their labor markets. Common methodologies are 
applied to extract empirical regularities from the region. Latin America and the Caribbean 
are of interest in their own right. But for several reasons, the lessons learned from studies 
of these labor markets have much greater generality. 
The shifts in the policy regimes experienced in the region are dramatic by OECD 
standards, and many of these regime shifts are exogenous. This large and exogenous 
variation provides identifying power not available to analysts studying regulation in 
Europe and North America. Given the evidence on the comparability of labor demand 
functions around the world summarized in Hamermesh (1993 and this volume), lessons 
about the impact of regulation learned from Latin labor markets apply more generally.  
The studies in this volume are based on microdata. Use of such data avoids reliance 
on fragile country aggregate statistics that have been the main source of information used 
to study European regulation (see, e.g. the evidence summarized in Nickell and Layard, 
1999). Countries have diverse economic regions and agents and aggregation over these 
regions and their economic agents masks this diversity. In this chapter, we show the 
sensitivity of estimates of the impact of regulation obtained from conventional pooled time 
series-cross sections of countries to alternative choices of samples and models, although a 
few important empirical regularities established at the microlevel hold up in macrodata. 
Our analysis builds the case for doing disaggregated analyses of the type reported in this 
book.  
The evidence presented here challenges one prevailing view that labor market 
regulations affect only the distribution of labor incomes and have minor effects on 6 
efficiency.
4  The results presented in this volume suggest that mandated benefits reduce 
employment and that job security regulations have a substantial impact on the distribution 
of employment and on turnover rates. The most adverse impact of regulation is on youth, 
marginal workers, and unskilled workers. Insiders and entrenched workers gain from 
regulation but outsiders suffer. As a consequence, job security regulations promote 
inequality among demographic groups. Most of the individual country studies demonstrate 
that regulations promoting job security reduce covered worker exit rates out of 
employment and out of unemployment, and on net reduce employment. 
   This introductory essay has three main goals. (1) It summarizes the main lessons to 
be drawn from the studies assembled here.  (2) It places Latin American and Caribbean 
(LAC) regulatory burden in an international context by comparing the level and changes in 
LAC labor regulation policies with those in OECD countries as well as providing some 
historical context about the origins of this regulation. (3) It updates the work of Heckman 
and PagØs (2000) with an expanded sample and better measures of regulation, providing a 
cross-country time-series analysis of the impact of regulation on employment and 
unemployment. We quantify the cost of regulation in LAC and OECD region. The fragility 
of the macro-based estimates documented in our paper suggests one reason why relatively 
little is known about the impact of regulations in Europe despite an abundance of cross-
country time-series papers analyzing policies in that region. However, the macro time-
series literature does produce some empirical regularities. The methods used to analyze the 
micro-evidence presented in this book should be extended to produce more convincing 
evidence of the impacts of regulations on employment in the OECD region
5. 
                                                           
4Freeman (2000) and Nickell and Layard (1999), among others, adopt this view. 
5See, however, the studies of Abowd et al. (1997, 1999, 2000), Machin and Stewart (1996), Kugler, Jimeno 
and Hernanz (2002) and others, who use microdata to investigate the impact of regulation in Europe. 7 
This Chapter proceeds in the following way.  Section 2 provides background on 
Latin American economic and labor market performance. Section 3 presents some basic 
facts about regulation in LAC, and compares LAC with OECD countries both in terms of 
the level and composition of labor cost and in terms of the labor market reforms 
experienced in the region. Section 4 summarizes the main lessons from the essays 
presented in this book. Section 5 updates Heckman and PagØs (2000) and uses the cost 
measures derived in Section 3 to examine the impacts of labor regulation on Latin 
American and OECD employment and unemployment rates. Section 6 concludes and 
makes suggestions for future work on regulation in Latin American and OECD labor 
markets. We first present some background on Latin America and the nature of labor 
market regulation in the region. 
 
2. Latin American Economic and Labor Market Performance 
Latin American economic performance has been quite disappointing.  Since 1970, 
growth of income per capita has been just over one percent a year, higher than in Africa or 
the Middle East, but much lower than in Asia or in the developed countries (Figure 1). Up 
to the 1980s, trade policies heavily protected Latin economies from foreign competition. 
There was a substantial degree of intervention by the state in the economy. The collapse of 
most economies during that decade due to growing fiscal and monetary imbalances led 
many countries to implement large structural reforms towards the end of the 1980s and 
early 1990s. Macroeconomic stabilization policies reduced fiscal deficits and brought 
inflation under control.  Sweeping, fast-paced trade reforms lowered substantial tariff 
barriers on manufactured goods. Governments undertook fiscal reforms, lifted control over 
financial markets and privatized most state-owned firms. Some countries also embarked on 8 
labor reforms described in the next section. While growth rates in the 1990s were higher 
than they were during the 1980s, the rates of growth in this period still fell short of those 
attained in other parts of the world.  
Among the countries covered in this volume (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Peru, Uruguay, Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago), Chile was the best 
performer, with an average growth rate of GDP of 4.8 during the period 1980-2001 (see 
Table 1). Argentina and Trinidad and Tobago experienced the lowest average growth 
during the past two decades, despite high average growth rates during the nineties.   
In spite of this weak economic performance, GDP per capita (PPP US$ adjusted) 
levels in Latin American countries are higher than those of other developing regions. 
According to the World Bank Development Indicators, in 2001, the average GDP per 
capita in the Latin America and the Caribbean region was $7,050, considerably higher than 
that of East Asia and the Pacific (4,233), Central and Eastern Europe (6,598), South Asia 
(2,730), Sub-Saharan Africa (1,831) or the Arab States (5,038). Similarly, the regional 
Human Development Index computed by the United Nations for LAC (0.77) was almost as 
high as in Central and Eastern Europe (0.78) and higher than in any other region except for 
the OECD (0.90). Among the countries whose labor markets are analyzed in this volume, 
Barbados and Argentina exhibited the highest income per capita and human development 
indexes while Jamaica and Peru rank the lowest among the countries both in per capita 
income and in human development (see Table 1).  
While GDP growth rates were not high, during the period 1980-1999 employment 
rates grew in the nine countries studied here. The highest growth rates were recorded in 
Colombia and Peru, countries that also experienced fast growth in female labor force 
participation. In contrast, average employment growth rates were low in Trinidad and 9 
Tobago and in Argentina. According to International Labor Organisation (ILO) and 
Economics Commission For Latin America and The Caribbean (ECLAC) data, average 
urban unemployment rates during the eighties and nineties exceeded 8 percent in all 
countries analyzed in this book except for Brazil.  Unemployment comparisons should be 
treated cautiously because they are not strictly comparable. For instance, in the Caribbean 
countries, the unemployment rates include discouraged workers (those who drop out of the 
labor force), while such workers are excluded in the Latin American countries, which 
compute unemployment rates according to more traditional definitions. 
6  Many have 
remarked that the high level of regulation of economic activity in the region accounts for 
problems in the labor markets in the region, and the essays assembled here shed light on 
this conjecture. 
 
3. Labor Market Regulations and Institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean 
This section sketches the history of labor market regulation in the region and 
describes and quantifies the regulatory environment in Latin America and the Caribbean. It 
compares the level of regulation and pace of regulatory reform in LAC countries and 
OECD countries. When it is credible to do so, we also make an effort to quantify the 
monetary costs (as a percentage of wages) of full compliance with regulations without 
discussing whether costs are borne by workers or firms. We discuss this issue more 
extensively in sections 4 and 5.  
 
 
Regulations governing individual contracts  
                                                           
6 That is, they only include persons that are available for work and who are taking specific steps to search for 
a job.  10 
Throughout Latin America, labor codes determine the types of contracts, the 
lengths of trial periods, and the conditions of part-time work. Regulations favor full-time, 
indefinite contracts over part-time, fixed-term or temporary contracts. As a form of worker 
protection, labor codes mandate a minimum advance notice period prior to termination, 
specify which causes are considered justified causes for dismissal, and establish 
compensation to be awarded to workers depending on the reason for the termination.  In 
contrast, temporary contracts can be terminated at no cost provided that the duration of the 
contract has expired. To prevent firms from exclusively hiring workers under temporary 
contracts, in most countries the use of such arrangements is severely restricted. Labor 
codes also limit trial periods ￿ that is, the period of time during which a firm can test and 
dismiss a worker at no cost if his or her performance is considered unsatisfactory.  
Although most OECD countries began regulating their labor markets when they 
had attained relatively high income per capita, Latin America and other developing 
countries started regulating their markets much earlier in the development process 
(Lindauer, 1999).  The first regulations date from the beginning of the twentieth century. 
The motivation for these regulations was the perceived need to protect the welfare of 
workers against the excessive power of employers, and to insure workers against the risk 
of job loss and income security (Lindauer, 1999). The Mexican constitution of 1917 
articulated the principle that protecting workers was one of the duties of the State.  By the 
1930s and 1940s most countries had a Labor Code. The belief that each new reform should 
only strengthen the set of warranties and benefits awarded from previous laws became 
widespread. For many years, successive reforms expanded the protection that the law 
afforded to workers. There was little examination of the question whether such regulations 
would affect economic performance. However, until the 1980s most countries in the LAC 11 
region were isolated and their industries heavily protected. Labor regulations were one way 
to distributing the rents from protection among covered workers and employers.  
Regulations are a low cost way (from the point of government fiscal authorities) of 
providing social insurance to protect workers. The weak fiscal systems in place in the 
region joined with the low level of income and a tradition of tax evasion, corruption and 
noncompliance made the social insurance schemes used in more developed countries 
prohibitively costly. 
Military rule often led to deregulation of many labor markets. Unions were frequent 
targets, as much for political as for economic reasons. The political and economic 
environment in LAC changed substantially in the 1980s and 1990s.  Most countries 
restored democracy after long periods of military rule.  These political changes bred some 
labor reforms, first to restore union activity, which had been made illegal in many military 
regimes, and second to reach a new social pact. In Chile, Brazil and the Dominican 
Republic, at the beginning of the 1990s and later in Nicaragua (1996) these reforms 
produced more protective labor regulations.  
A new Constitution was enacted in 1988 in Brazil as part of the process of re-
democratization during the second half of the 1980s (See Paes de Barros and Corseuil, this 
volume). This new Constitution revised labor regulations and changed many labor codes 
that had been in place since the 1940s. The new Constitution reduced the maximum 
working hours per week from 48 to 44 hours; reduced the maximum number of hours for a 
continuous work shift from 8 to 6 hours; increased the minimum overtime premium from 
20 percent to 50 percent; increased maternity leave from 3 to 4 months; and the value of 
paid vacations increased from 1 to, at least, 4/3 of the normal monthly wage. The new 
Constitution also modified the mandatory individual saving accounts system created in 12 
1966. Prior to the reforms, the law required employers to deposit 8 percent of employees￿ 
wages in a worker-owned account. In case of separation, workers could withdraw the 
accumulated funds (plus the interest rate). In addition, if a firm initiated a separation it had 
to pay a penalty equivalent to 10 percent of the amount accumulated in the account.  As 
part of the 1988 reform, this penalty was increased to 40 percent, considerably increasing 
the cost of dismissing a worker.  
In the case of Chile, the 1990 reform introduced with the return to democracy 
reestablished some of the protection to workers that had been eliminated during the 
military regime. Under the dictatorship, union activity had been severely restricted and 
some benefits, such as indemnities for dismissal had been substantially reduced.
7 See 
Montenegro and PagØs (this volume). In 1990, the new law increased maximum 
indemnities from 5 to 11 months of pay.  It also re-introduced the need for firms to prove 
just cause for dismissal, although unlike the case in other countries, the new law 
considered the economic needs of the firm a just cause.  
While in some countries lawmakers were busy increasing legal protection for 
workers, the economic environment was changing substantially.  The deep economic crisis 
that ensued with the Debt Crisis of the early 1980s called into question the protectionist 
model. The relatively good performance of the Chilean economy, which in the mid 1970s 
opened to trade and introduced many pro-market reforms, spawned imitators all across 
Latin America. By the second half of the 1980s and the early 1990s, most countries had 
drastically reduced tariffs on imports. The new openness to international trade increased 
the demand for labor market flexibility. It was argued that without sweeping labor market 
reforms, Latin American economies would not be able to compete internationally. This 
                                                           
7 See Montenegro and PagØs, this volume. 13 
was the main motivation behind the reforms that introduced temporary contracts in 
Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Peru and that reduced the cost of dismissing 
workers with indefinite contracts in Colombia (1990) and Peru (1991). Temporary and 
fixed-term contracts were introduced in Argentina in 1991 and their role was expanded in 
1995 (See Hopenhayn, this volume). These changes were influenced by similar reforms in 
Spain during the 1980s. Special fixed-term duration employment promotion contracts 
could be awarded to unemployed workers and to workers younger than 25 and older than 
40 years old. For some types of contracts, severance pay was reduced by 100 percent.  
However, these contracts were eliminated in 1998, when the share of persons working 
under these arrangements had increased substantially. Ecuador, Peru and Colombia also 
lifted restrictions on the use of these types of programs in the early 1990s. In Peru, the 
number of workers hired under these contracts increased enormously.  In Brazil, the use of 
such contracts has been liberalized since 1998.   
The 1991 reforms in Peru reduced the cost of dismissing workers hired under 
indefinite contracts. During 1971-1991, workers who had completed trial periods were 
granted permanent job security. If a firm dismissed a worker and could not prove "just 
cause" in labor courts, the worker could choose between being reinstated in his or her job 
or receiving a severance payment of three monthly wages per year of work (with a 
maximum of 12 months pay). In practice, since workers could always ask to be reinstated 
and then settle for a higher severance pay, the mandatory amount was a lower bound of the 
firing cost. See Saavedra and Torero (this volume). 
Beginning in 1991, workers hired after that year could be dismissed at will upon 
payment of a severance benefit. In addition, ￿just cause￿ clauses were extended to allow 
the dismissal of workers who did not perform up to expectations. The severance pay 14 
schedule was reduced from three to one wage for every year of tenure for workers with 
more than one year in the firm, with a minimum of three wages and a maximum of twelve. 
The 1993 Constitution replaced the right of workers to a permanent job with the right of 
firms to dismiss workers.  In July 1995, a second wave of labor reforms, simplified the 
severance payment to one month per year of work up to a maximum of 12 months and the 
two-tier severance system was eliminated. These modifications substantially reduced the 
cost of dismissing workers. However, in November 1996, the severance payments rule was 
increased again to one and a half wages per year of work with an unaltered maximum cap 
of twelve wages.  
In Colombia, the 1990 Labor reforms liberalized many aspects of labor regulation. 
Besides regulations introducing the use of temporary contracts, the most important changes 
were those in the Cesantias, or severance pay that firms owed to workers at the end of the 
work relationship regardless of the cause or the party that initiated separation.  Prior to the 
reforms, employers were mandated to pay severance of one month per year at the time of 
the separation based on the salary at the separation. Workers could obtain advanced 
payments against their benefits. Such withdrawals were credited against the severance pay 
due workers at the end of the labor relationship in nominal terms as of the date of the 
withdrawal. High rates of inflation increased the costs of such schemes to employers. After 
the reform, the withdrawals were credited in real terms, substantially reducing costs for 
firms.  In addition, the reforms eliminated the right to re-instatement for workers with 
more than ten years of tenure. Offsetting these cost-reducing features, the reforms 
increased the cost of indemnities for dismissal.  
Panama (1995) and Venezuela (1997) also undertook labor reforms with the goal of 
increasing labor market flexibility while preserving some form of protection to workers.   15 
In both countries reforms increased mandatory pay in case of separation, but considerably 
reduced the additional amount that firms had to pay in case of a firm-initiated dismissal.  
In contrast to Latin American regulation, in the Caribbean a mixture of legislation, 
common law doctrines, custom and policy characterizes the institutional context.  At the 
beginning of the Twentieth Century, in all countries of that region, regulation of the labor 
market was based on common law rather than on the Civil Law tradition predominant in 
Latin America (see Downes, Mamingi and Antoine, this volume). While in some countries, 
like Barbados, most aspects of labor relation are still left to the courts to determine, in 
others, such as in Trinidad and Tobago, the enactment of different regulations has 
progressively increased the level of statutory protection to workers. In Barbados (1973), 
Trinidad & Tobago (1974) and Jamaica (1985) labor reforms instituted mandatory 
severance pay, although as shown in the next section at levels that are much lower than 
those prevalent in Latin America.  
 
Payroll Contributions and other Mandatory Benefits 
As in most industrial countries, in LAC many social protection programs, such as 
old-age pensions, public health systems, unemployment subsidies, and family allowances 
are funded from payroll contributions.  In addition, regulations mandate other employee-
paid benefits such as occupational health and safety provisions, maternity and sick leave, 
overtime pay and vacations.   
Unlike changes in labor codes that tend to be infrequent events, changes in the level 
of contributions to these programs occur often. In addition, during the 1990s, many 
countries implemented reforms, which transformed pay-as-you-go systems into full or 
partial capitalization systems. One of the advantages of such schemes is that they tend to 16 
increase the link between contributions and benefits. However, at the same time, many 
countries, most noticeably Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico, Uruguay, and Brazil, increased 
the level of payroll taxes to reduce the actuarial imbalances present in their social security 
systems. Below, we quantify the levels and changes in these contributions across Latin 
America and OECD countries.  
 
Collective Bargaining 
Unions in Latin America tend to be firm or sector-based and weak.  In most cases, 
the state intervenes in union registration and accreditation as well as in the process of 
collective bargaining. The state authorizes only certain unions to have representation 
authority (Argentina, Mexico, Peru, Brazil), and intervenes in the resolution of conflicts 
and the arbitration process (Argentina, Mexico). Only in Brazil and Argentina is collective 
bargaining highly centralized at the sector level, while in Nicaragua and Colombia, sector-
level bargaining coexists with firm-based negotiation.  In Mexico, collective bargaining 
takes place at the firm level but a high level of centralization is achieved through a strong 
corporatist structure and through union discipline (O￿Connell, 1999). In contrast, unions 
are stronger and collective bargaining tends to be national or sector-based in OECD 
countries with the exception of Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United 
States.   
  According to data from ILO (97-98), union density as percentage of non-
agricultural employment is higher in Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Nicaragua and smaller 
in the rest of the Latin American countries. Union affiliation tends to be higher in countries 
where collective bargaining is more centralized. Overall, union density is lower in Latin 17 
America (14.7) than in industrial countries (36.6).
8 There are also large differences in 
coverage rates.  Thus, while collective bargaining agreements in countries such as Spain, 
France and Greece, which are negotiated by a minority, are extended to almost all 
employees, in Latin American countries this is generally not the case.  As a result, 
coverage rates in Latin America tend to be much lower than those observed in OECD 
countries with similar affiliation rates.  
The influence that collective bargaining exerts on wage and employment 
conditions, measured by affiliation rates, is declining over time. Thus, Latin American and 
Caribbean countries share a trend that has been well documented for OECD countries. 
Affiliation rates have declined in all of the countries of the region.
9  This decline has been 
especially large in Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela, Costa Rica and Uruguay.  In this 
chapter, we only present estimates for Uruguay on the impact of unionization on 
employment.  Cassoni, Allen and Labadie (this volume) estimate a strong adverse impact 
of unionism on employment in Uruguay.  The evidence for other Latin American countries 
is still too sparse.  
 
Minimum Wages 
Minimum wages are widely used in Latin America to increase the wages of the 
poorest workers. Figure 2 (taken from Maloney and Nuæez-Mendez, this volume) ranks 
various Latin American and OECD countries by their minimum wage, standardized by the 
                                                           
8 ILO data corresponds to the mid nineties. The comparison between LAC and Industrial countries reflects 
the difference between unweighted regional averages. The average for industrial countries includes the 
following countries (France, Spain, US, Greece, Germany, Italy, UK, Denmark, Belgium, Finland, Iceland, 
Ireland, Sweden and Canada) 
9 ILO data for 1985 and 1993 indicates that union affiliation increased in Chile during that period. Yet, data 
from a later period indicates that union affiliation has been declining since 1993.  18 
mean wage.
10 While some Latin American countries appear in the lower range of this 
distribution, most notably Uruguay, Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Mexico, others, 
such as, Venezuela, El Salvador, Paraguay and Honduras have very high minimum to 
average minimum wages by OECD standards. These high levels suggest that minimum 
wages are likely to be binding, and, as a result, to reduce employment, and to retard 
downward wage movements in the presence of adverse demand shocks. 
Data on enforcement of the minimum wage is incomplete. However, some 
evidence available for workers between 25 and 40 years old suggests that about 10 percent 
of wage employees in that age range earn salaries below the minimum wage (See Table 2). 
In some countries, such as Mexico, Uruguay, Bolivia and Argentina, the proportion below 
the minimum in this age range is very small. In other countries, such as Colombia, 
minimum to average wages are high but a large proportion of the labor force in the 25 to 
40 age-range earns wages below the statutory minimum. Whether the adverse effect of a 
high level of minimum wages is offset by substantial non-compliance remains an open 
empirical question. 
 
What motivates reforms? 
In studying the effect of reforms in the labor market it is important to examine what 
factors initiate these relatively infrequent episodes. It could be argued that labor market 
outcomes are driven by the same events that drive the reforms, and not by the labor 
reforms themselves. Figures 3A-3F (for Latin America) and 3G-3I (for the Caribbean) plot 
GDP growth rates and unemployment rates for the countries covered in the individual 
                                                           
10 The observations are from the early nineties for the OECD countries and from the mid and late nineties for 
LAC. Data from OECD were obtained from Dolado et al (1996), data from LAC comes from IADB (1998-
1999) and Maloney and Nuæez.  19 
country studies of this volume during the period 1980-2000. They also plot major episodes 
of labor reform (marked with a continuous line if a liberalization of the labor market 
occurred and dotted line if the reforms increased protection to workers).
11  In addition, 
these figures mark episodes of major tariff reductions (double line) or the end of military 
regimes and the return to democracy (discontinue line). 
In Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay, reforms that liberalized the labor 
market occurred within one or two years before or after major reductions in tariffs, and 
were part of efforts to liberalize economies and increase the participation of the market in 
the production and allocation of goods and services. In Chile and Brazil, reforms that 
increased the legal protection of workers occurred in the context of a transition to 
democracy.  In all of these episodes it could be argued that labor reforms were exogenous 
to the economic system since they were driven either by a new economic philosophy or by 
profound transformations in political regimes, although one could counter that these 
political transitions were facilitated by economic developments. Some reforms and 
transformations are clearly driven by changes in economic activity. There is evidence that 
many reforms tend to occur around periods of negative economic growth. In the countries 
and periods analyzed in this volume, there have been at least 15 episodes of reform. Out of 
these fifteen, six episodes of reform occurred in years in which GDP had declined the year 
before.  However, four of those reforms increased the legal protection to workers and two 
liberalized the labor market.  
Overall there is no empirical relationship between labor reforms and labor market 
outcomes driven by economic performance. Our cross-country time-series analysis 
                                                           
11 Only major changes in labor codes or other major government interventions in the labor market are 
included.  Changes in social security contributions or payroll taxes, as well as changes in the level of 
minimum wages ￿which occur quite frequently-- are not included.  20 
presented in this chapter controls for present and past levels of economic activity, to 
account for the possibility of endogeneity. The disaggregated studies use year effects and 
other strategies to control for endogeneity. 
 
Quantifying the Cost of Regulation 
This section constructs measures of labor laws that can be compared across 
countries and time (see also Heckman and PagØs, 2000). Many studies that summarize 
institutional data across countries construct qualitative indices that rank variables across 
countries. For instance, Grubb and Wells (1993) construct a series of indicators of 
employment protection by ranking different aspects of job protection across countries and 
averaging these different rankings in one summary indicator. Although such measures 
summarize many complex institutional features, they are not comparable over time. A 
second group of studies constructs measures that aggregate institutional aspects of the 
labor market by assigning to each country/year a value in a certain range, for instance, 
between zero and one.  These measures summarize a large number of interesting aspects 
and are comparable across time. However, they can also be quite arbitrary since it is 
difficult to justify any assigned numerical values for qualitative variables and it is difficult 
to compare one measure against another. Moreover, the measures are very sensitive to the 
weights assigned to the different components of these measures. From a policy standpoint, 
summarizing many features of a regulatory system in one indicator makes it impossible to 
distinguish which components, if any, have an adverse effect on employment. 
We take a different route by constructing measures of the direct cost (measured as a 
fraction of average monthly wages) of complying with labor laws.  These measures can be 
compared not only across countries and over time, but they can also be compared against 21 
each other. This allows us to quantify, for instance, the share of the total costs given by 
each type of regulation. Our measure of mandatory total costs (TC) of regulations is: 
TC = SSP +  JS 
It is the sum of the cost of social security payments (SSP) plus the cost of abiding by job 
security provisions (JS). These costs are expressed as fractions of the average monthly 
wage. 
This measure of the cost of regulation omits some important components of labor 
cost. For example, the costs of abiding by certain laws are hard to quantify and are omitted.  
One example of laws whose costs are difficult to quantify, is the prohibition against 
dismissing workers in bad times.  In addition, this measure does not include the cost of 
regulating the length of the standard workweek and overtime work. It does not include the 
cost of complying with minimum wage laws or other income floors. We do not include 
regulations on temporary labor contracts. Although these regulations are likely to have 
effects on employment and unemployment, we choose to exclude them because 
comparable data on the share of the labor force affected by these regulations across time 
and countries are difficult to obtain. We leave the quantification of these features of 
regulations for future work. 
There is one major conceptual problem with this index. It does not distinguish 
between static and dynamic aspects of the cost of labor. Job security affects both 
components of costs by raising the total cost of labor and by increasing the cost of 
adjusting labor. Social security costs affect the unit cost of labor without affecting dynamic 
costs of labor. Our index of total cost is not a measure of the price of labor facing firms at 
different stages of the business cycle. We develop this point below and in Appendix B. 
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Quantifying Job Security Provisions 
Our index includes in job security legislation those provisions of the law that increase 
the cost of dismissing a worker for economic reasons.
12 Across countries, termination laws 
require firms to incur at least five types of costs: administrative procedures, advance 
notification, indemnities for dismissal, seniority pay and the legal costs of a trial if workers 
contest dismissals.  Administrative procedures require the firm to notify and seek approval 
by labor unions or the Ministry of Labor to extend the period between layoff decisions and 
the actual occurrence of layoffs. They may also involve long negotiations to place workers 
in alternative jobs.  The period of advance notification should also be included in the 
computation of labor costs because in many countries, laws allow firms to choose between 
providing advance notice or paying a compensation equivalent to the wages for the 
corresponding period. Moreover, since productivity declines substantially after notice, 
advance notification should be considered as a part of dismissal costs even when firms 
choose to notify workers in advance. Therefore, we assume that employees do not work at 
full productivity levels after notification.
13 In most countries, mandatory advance notice 
periods increase with tenure, and in others they are higher for white-collar than for blue-
collar workers. 
Most Latin American and OECD countries mandate indemnities in cases of firm-
initiated dismissal. In general, indemnities are based on multiples of the most recent wage 
and the years of service. Some countries calculate the amount of mandatory indemnities 
based on whether the dismissal is deemed just or unjust or whether the worker is blue-
                                                           
12 In most countries, the law does not mandate compensation for dismissal if the separation is due to 
employees￿ misdemeanors.  However, if such behavior cannot be proved, the worker has to be compensated 
at the regular legal rate. 
13There is some evidence that advance notice stimulates on-the-job search during the notification period 
(Addison and Portugal 1992), which suggests a reduction in the effort devoted to work.  23 
collar or white-collar. In contrast, seniority pay is only mandated in a few Latin American 
countries in which the law requires employers to make a payment upon termination of the 
work relationship regardless of the cause or party initiating the separation. In these 
countries, firms initiating dismissal are required to pay both indemnities and seniority pay.  
In some countries, this payment is deposited as a regular contribution to the worker￿s 
individual savings account. In these countries, workers can withdraw principal and interest 
from their account upon separation. In other countries, seniority pay is determined as a 
given amount that has to be paid to the worker upon termination of the work relationship.
14  
Finally, firms can incur considerable additional costs if workers contest dismissal in courts. 
If judges rule in favor of workers, firms not only have to pay indemnities, but also the 
workers￿ foregone wages during trial. 
To compute the monetary cost of labor laws, we improve on the job security measures 
developed in Heckman and PagØs (2000) in three ways. First, we expand our previous data 
base to include the 1980s in all OECD countries. This expansion of the data set allows us 
to capture some additional labor reforms in OECD countries not previously captured. 
Second, we revise and correct some of our previous data on advance notice and 
indemnities for a number of countries to better capture the actual cost of the law (see 
Appendix A for a complete description of the methodology and assumptions involved). 
Finally, we include the cost of seniority pay in our measure of job security, which we did 
not include in our previous work.  
Our measure of the cost of job security  jt JS  for country j at time t is constructed 
from the following formula:  
 
                                                           
14 For an extensive description of job security measures see OECD (1993, 1999) for OECD countries and IADB (1996).  24 
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where δ is the probability of a worker remaining in a job in a period, β is the discount 
factor, i denotes tenure at the firm, and T is the maximum tenure that a worker can attain in 
a firm which is assumed to be twenty years (T=20). The expression is broken down into 
three terms corresponding to advanced notice costs ( , AN jt), indemnity costs ( , IDjt) and 
seniority pay ( , SenPjt). The first term in expression (1) is the discounted cost of future 
advance notice, weighted by the probability that a worker will be dismissed, after one, two, 
three, and so on, periods at the firm where bj,t+i  is the advance notice to a worker who has 
been i years at a firm measured in monthly wages.  The second term in expression (1) is 
the discounted cost of future indemnities, weighted by the probability of dismissal after i 
periods at the firm.  In this expression, aj denotes the probability that the economic 
difficulties of the firm are considered a just cause of dismissal while yj,t+i
jc  (yj,t+i
uc) is the 
mandated indemnity in case of just cause (unjust cause) dismissal, again measured in 
monthly wages.  Finally, the third term in expression (1) captures the cost of severance 
pay, and cj,t+i denotes contributions to a workers￿ savings account measured in monthly 
wages.
15 We assume a common discount and dismissal rate of 8 and 12 percent, 
respectively across countries.  The choice of the discount rate is based on the historical 
returns of an internationally diversified portfolio.  Our choice of the turnover rate is 
motivated by the concern that turnover rates are affected by the legislation in countries 25 
with job security provisions. We use a benchmark turnover rate from the United States, a 
country with lower job security costs than any country in our LAC sample. If intrinsic 
turnover in LAC is higher than in the U.S, we understate costs. The choice of this 
benchmark is clearly a rough way to avoid endogeneity problems. To assign values to the 
discounted future payments of advance notice, indemnities and seniority pay, we use the 
information contained in Tables A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A. When regulations mandate 
different provisions for white-collar and blue-collar workers, we take the unweighted 
average for the two types of workers. 
  By construction, our job security measures give a higher weight to dismissal costs 
that may arise soon after a worker is hired since they are discounted less at the time of 
hiring, while they discount more firing costs that arise further in the future. Our measure 
captures the expected average cost. Consequently, it does not measure the true marginal 
labor cost, which is state contingent, nor does it distinguish dynamic from static costs, as 
we have previously noted. We discuss these issues further in Appendix B. 
 
Quantifying the Cost of Social Security  
To quantify the cost of social security regulations and payroll taxation, we gather 
data on mandatory payroll contributions to old age, disability and death, sickness and 
maternity, work injury, unemployment insurance and family allowances programs.  Since 
the nominal incidence of the contributions (whether they fall on the employer or the 
employee) is irrelevant in measuring total social cost (although it is not irrelevant for the 
study of labor demand), we add both contributions as a percentage of wages. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
15 In countries where the law mandates seniority pay, but this pay is not capitalized in individual savings 
accounts, cj, t+i  measures  the  costs associated with this provision, which will arise in the future with 
probability one.  26 
To quantify the cost of social security provisions in a way that is comparable to the cost of 







i t j ss + ,
 and 
w
i t j ss + ,  are, respectively, the costs of payroll taxes paid by the employer 
and the worker expressed as a percent of wages, and β  is the discount rate.
16  
 
The Cost of Labor Laws across Countries 
Table 3 summarizes our measures of the cost associated with different labor regulation 
regimes. In the first three columns, we summarize the cost of abiding by employment 
protection laws at the end of the 1990s. We generate these indices for all countries in all 
years for which we have data. Table 3 only reports those values for the last year of our 
sample. Column (1) summarizes the cost of giving advance notice to workers. In the Latin 
American countries, the typical required advance notice is a month or the equivalent to 
0.63 monthly wages in expected value terms. Bolivia stands out as the country that 
requires a longer advance notice period (1.77 months in expected terms), while Peru and 
Uruguay require no advance notice. Mandatory advance notice provisions tend to be more 
stringent in OECD countries. Many OECD countries mandate fairly long advance notice 
periods, particularly for skilled workers. In addition, in most countries, advance notice 
periods increase with seniority. In Belgium, for instance, the mandatory advance notice for 
                                                           
16 We obtain the information on these contributions from the series ￿Social Security Programs Throughout 






jtj t i j t i
i
SSP ss ss β ++
=
=+ ∑27 
skilled workers with 10 years of seniority is 9 months, while for workers with 20 years of 
seniority it is 15 months.  In Sweden, all workers with 10 years of seniority are entitled to 
an advance notice period of 5 months, whereas for a worker with 20 years of seniority, the 
mandatory advance notice period is 6 months. The fact that Belgium and Sweden have 
very similar values in Table 3 reflects the fact that in Belgium very high advance notice 
only applies to skilled workers whereas in Sweden it applies to all workers. It also reflects 
the fact that our measure heavily discounts costs that are expected to occur far in the 
future.  On average, mandated advance notice periods are significantly longer in OECD 
countries than in the Latin American and Caribbean sample.  
The second column displays the cost of indemnities for dismissal.  Within the LAC 
sample, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, El Salvador, and Honduras stand out as 
countries where the cost of abiding by these regulations is the highest. In the sample of 
OECD countries, Portugal, Turkey, Korea, Italy and Spain are the ones where indemnities 
for dismissal laws are more costly (in terms of expected monthly wages), while a number 
of countries including Belgium, Finland, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States do not mandate indemnities 
for dismissal. Comparing the two regional samples, it is clear that, on average, 
compensation for dismissal is three times larger in LAC than in the OECD countries 
despite the much lower level of income in the LAC region.  
The third column refers to seniority pay. This additional payment is mandatory in only 
six Latin American countries, but the estimated expected discounted costs are large when 
this feature is present. In Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador and Peru, employers are required to 
deposit about one month of pay every year to workers￿ individual savings accounts. Over 
the life of a worker, this provision is expected to cost about 10 monthly wages in these four 28 
countries. Once advance notice, compensation for dismissal and severance pay are added, 
we find that the cost of job security provisions is much higher in the poorer Latin 
American and Caribbean region than in the richer OECD sample. 
The fourth column reports the expected costs of complying with social security laws. 
Compared to the costs of employment security, social security costs are very large and 
therefore constitute the lion￿s share of the total costs of labor laws.  In Argentina, for 
example, expected discounted costs of social security are 44.5 months of pay while in 
many OECD countries these costs are even larger. In the average Latin American country, 
social security payments amount to 82 percent of the total costs of labor laws. This 
percentage is even larger in OECD countries where, on average, they reach 96 percent of 
the total regulatory costs.   
Once all the costs are aggregated, labor laws impose a much larger cost in OECD 
countries.  However, the composition of these costs is quite different. While the typical 
Latin American country mandates shorter advance notice periods and lower social security 
contributions than the average OECD country, job security provisions are substantially 
higher in LAC.  
Latin American and Caribbean countries have a higher burden of regulations that affect 
adjustment processes in the labor market. European countries have a higher burden of 
payroll taxation that affects labor demand but not labor adjustment. Both regions have a 
much higher burden of labor costs than North America. 
Exploring the relationship between income per capita and social protection across 
countries, it is clear that job security provisions are strategies of low income regions. 
Figure 4 graphs regression relationships for each of our measures of labor cost on GDP per 
capita (PPP adjusted) and GDP squared. Across countries, advance notice costs tend to 29 
increase with income; seniority pay and indemnities for dismissal decline with country 
income. Social security contributions follow an inverted U-shape pattern in income. They 
tend to increase with income in the Latin American sample and reach a maximum in 
medium income countries, while they tend to decline with income within the sample of 
upper-income countries. Regulation is an inferior good. It is the response of poor countries 
to the demand for worker security. By imposing a mandate on firms, central governments 
avoid the direct fiscal cost of financing social safety nets albeit at the cost of affecting their 
labor market performance.  
We next examine the evolution of these measures over time. Since the early 80￿s 
there have been few reforms in job security provisions in Latin America and even fewer in 
OECD countries. Social security contributions have changed more, but even they seldom 
change drastically. This lack of variability, particularly in job security provisions, poses a 
challenge for empirical studies of the impact of regulations. Figure 5 shows the level and 
the changes in job security since the late eighties across Latin American countries. The 
general view that there have been important reductions in dismissal costs in Latin America 
is not accurate once we aggregate across all components of job security. Only Colombia, 
Panama, Peru and Venezuela have experienced a reduction in the costs of terminating 
indefinite contracts. In Venezuela and Panama, the reduction in indemnities has been partly 
offset by increases in the costs of severance pay. Our measures reveal that Brazil, the 
Dominican Republic, Chile and Nicaragua undertook reforms that increased the cost of 
dismissal.  Assembling Latin American and OECD events, there are 13 episodes in which 
job security provisions were changed. Nine of these episodes occurred in Latin America 
and four occurred in the OECD sample. Figure 6 shows the percentage change in advance 
notice and indemnities for dismissal in the countries that have experienced reforms.  It 30 
makes clear that changes in job security costs have been substantial in Latin America 
relative to the OECD sample. The enormous variation in the Latin American region and 
the exogeneity of some of the reforms is the reason why we think that the study of Latin 
American labor markets can inform further analyses of the impacts of regulation in 
economies around the world. 
Figure 7 reports social security contributions (measured in expected discounted 
cost terms) at the beginning and at the end of the nineties for Latin American Countries. 
There have been important changes during the last decade. In many countries, social 
security contributions increased during the nineties as a consequence of pension reforms 
and population aging. Yet, in some countries, most significantly in Argentina, social 
security contributions were reduced during the decade. 
 
Enforcement and Informality 
The measures summarized in Table 4 calculate de jure cost of regulations, 
assuming that firms and workers abide by the text of the law.  In practice, however, 
enforcement is at best weak, and many workers end up not being covered by mandatory 
regulations. Such workers are often referred to as informal workers. Given the difficulties 
in measuring the extent of informality, different approaches have been followed in the 
literature. Some authors follow the traditional ILO approach of classifying as informal 
those workers who are either self-employed, work for firms with five or less employees, 
work as unpaid family help or are employed as domestic workers.  Although some of these 
workers may be receiving the benefits prescribed by the law, there tends to be a high 
correlation between being in any of these categories of employment and not being covered 
by labor laws. Other authors use a more direct measure of informality, computing the 31 
percentage of workers who are affiliated with social security programs or have a formal 
labor contract. All authors in this volume use a ￿benefits￿ definition of informality except 
for the study by Maloney and Nuæez-Mendez, which follows the ILO convention.  
   Measured by the extent of compliance with social security regulations in Latin 
America, non-compliance is substantial. According to IADB (2003), only 39 percent of all 
workers and 60 percent of all wage employees are contributing to such programs (See 
Table 2). Among the countries covered in the individual studies of this volume, 
compliance as percentage of total employment is the highest in Chile and Uruguay and the 
lowest in Peru. Compliance tends to be higher among skilled workers, among workers 
employed in larger firms and in the manufacturing and high-paying finance and business 
services sectors.  In these latter sectors, the effect of regulations should be easier to detect. 
Compliance is higher when the burden of regulation is lower.   
 
4. The Impact of Labor Market Regulations  
This section summarizes the studies of the impact of labor market regulations that are 
presented in this volume and places them in the context of the literature on more 
economically developed countries. We distinguish between policies that alter employment 
levels (generating static costs) from policies that affect employment flows (generating 
dynamic transition costs). The essays contained in this book present evidence on both 
types of policies.  We also report findings on the effects of temporary contracts and 
minimum wages. 
 
4.1 A Static Labor Demand-Labor Supply Analysis 32 
A convenient starting point from which to assess the impact of labor market 
regulations on employment levels the standard neoclassical labor demand-labor supply 
framework. If mandatory legislation increases labor costs, economic theory predicts that a 
move up the labor demand function produces a fall in employment. The slope of the labor 
demand schedule provides a good measure of the policy-induced change in employment 
when governments or trade unions set labor costs administratively. The standard theory is 
silent about the effects of the regulation on unemployment because it depends on whether 
the displaced workers drop out of the labor force or attempt to seek new jobs.  
Table 4 summarizes estimates of constant-output labor demand elasticities for Latin 
America. As noted by Hamermesh (this volume), these estimates are comparable to those 
estimated for other countries.
17  Although labor demand studies abound, we focus on those 
studies that use disaggregated industry or individual firm data to infer the labor demand 
parameters, since models fit on such data produces more reliable estimates of underlying 
production parameters than models fit on data at higher levels of aggregation (Hamermesh, 
1993). Comparisons across types of workers indicate that labor demand elasticities are 
larger for blue-collar than for white-collar workers, suggesting a lower impact of 
regulations on the employment rates of the latter. Estimates of labor demand for Latin 
America tend to be somewhat lower than those obtained for other countries of the world, 
especially those estimated for Peru and Mexico. (See the estimates from industrial 
countries in the lower panel of the table.) Nonetheless, all estimates are between 0 and ￿
1.5, and most of them cluster between ￿0.2 and -0.6, well within the range for worldwide 
                                                           
17 A more comprehensive measure of the impact of regulations on employment is given by the total elasticity, 
that includes the possible scale effects of an increase in regulation including the entry and exit of firms due to 
changes in labor costs. Unfortunately, there is very little empirical evidence in this book regarding the 
magnitude of the total elasticity although studies by Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta (2003) suggest that entry and exit decisions are an important component of the response to 
regulation. 33 
estimates reported by Hamermesh (1993) for output- constant labor demand elasticities.
18  
This range of estimates implies that a 10 percent increase in labor costs will result in a 
sizable decline in employment, between 2 percent and 6 percent.  
The preceding analysis assumes that the cost of regulations is entirely paid by 
employers. However, when the supply of labor is not perfectly elastic, part of the increase 
in labor costs will be compensated by lower wages, reducing the disemployment effect of 
the regulations. Alternatively, workers may not perceive the cost of regulation as a tax, 
since higher contributions pay for improved job benefits, which are valued. In this case, 
workers will be willing to pay for this benefit, reducing their wage demands. This wage 
offset would also contribute to lessening the impact of regulations on employment. 
How likely is it that the costs of labor market regulations are shifted to workers in 
Latin America? Before reviewing the existing evidence, it is important to note important 
features of Latin American labor markets. First, high evasion implies that the relevant 
labor supply to the formal sector in developing countries is likely to be more elastic than in 
developed ones. Thus, if workers have access to similar jobs in both the formal and 
informal sectors, the possibilities of shifting costs to workers are lessened, resulting in a 
high elasticity of labor supply to formal sector firms that comply with regulations. Second, 
as previously noted, in some countries minimum wages are quite high, both absolutely and 
in relation to the average wage and this reduces the scope for wage shifts (see Figure 2). 
Moreover, Maloney and Nuæez-Mendez (this volume) show piling up of workers at 
minimum wage levels, suggests that compliance with the minimum wage is substantial 
even in the so called ￿informal￿ sectors so that wage shifting will be attenuated in 
countries with a binding minimum wage that also affects the informal sector. Third, 
                                                           
18 Hamermesh reports a range between -0.15 and -0.75 and an average estimate of -0.45.  34 
although most social security programs in the region are restricted to covered workers, and 
this tightens the link between contributions and benefits, the dismal financial condition of 
some social security systems and the high degree of discretion exercised by governments 
over the determination of benefits weaken this link. In this respect, the recent social 
security reforms aimed at privatizing pensions should strengthen the relationship between 
benefits and costs in many countries of the region. 
Several empirical studies have attempted to measure the impact of mandatory 
benefits on employment rates. Gruber (1994) analyzes the effects of insurance for 
workplace injuries and mandated maternity benefits in the U.S. and finds that a large share 
of the cost is shifted to wages with only minor disemployment effects. In contrast, 
Kaestner (1996) examines the effect of unemployment insurance contributions on the 
employment of U.S. youth and finds large disemployment effects and little wage shifting.  
For developing countries, there is some evidence on the magnitude of wage shifts 
predating the studies collected in this volume. MacIsaac and Rama (1997) assess the 
fungibility of the cost of mandated benefits in Ecuador.  In 1994, the year they study, 
Ecuador had one of the most cumbersome labor legislation regimes in Latin America. 
Beyond mandated contributions to social security programs, the law also mandated 
payment of thirteen, fourteen, fifteen and sixteen-month payments for separation at various 
times of the same year. MacIsaac and Rama￿s analysis suggests that while labor market 
regulations increase labor costs, part of the increase is shifted to workers in the form of 
lower base wages.  Thus, for an average Ecuadorian worker, social security contributions 
and other mandated benefits amount to at least 57 percent of the base wage. However, 
workers whose employers comply with regulations earn on average only 18 percent more 
than workers at non-compliant firms. This difference is explained by a 39 percent 35 
reduction in the base earnings of workers in compliant firms. Interestingly, these 
reductions are not uniform across firms; they are smaller in larger firms and essentially 
zero in the public sector and in unionized firms.  
Mondino and Montoya (this volume) and Edwards and Cox-Edwards (1999) 
explore this topic for Argentina and Chile, respectively, by comparing wages of workers 
who have access to social security programs with wages of uncovered workers. In 
Argentina, Mondino and Montoya (this volume) find that during the period 1975-1996, 
wages of non-covered workers were 8 percent higher than the gross wages of covered 
workers. Considering that employee-paid payroll contributions average 40 percent of the 
payroll, the share of contributions paid by workers is around 20 percent of total labor costs.  
In Chile, Edwards and Cox-Edwards find evidence of a larger wage shift. In 1994, cash 
wages for workers covered by mandatory pension, health, and life insurance were 14 
percent lower than wages for non-covered workers. Since in that year, social security 
contributions amounted to 20 percent of wages and were nominally paid by workers, their 
estimates suggest that about 70 percent of the cost of social security contributions were 
absorbed by workers, while the other 30 percent fell on employers. Gruber (1997) reports 
evidence of an even larger wage shift in the aftermath of the 1981 pension reform in Chile.  
The 1981 reform reduced employer-paid labor taxes and increased taxes paid by 
employees.  In addition, the funding of some programs was shifted to general revenue. 
Using this tax change as a ￿natural experiment￿ and data on individual firms￿ payments in 
labor taxes and wages, he seeks to determine whether lower employer-paid labor taxes are 36 
associated with higher wages within a firm. His results suggest a full-shift of payroll taxes 
to wages and no effect on employment.
19 
Marrufo (2001) examines the 1997 reform in Mexico, which, as in Chile, 
transformed the pay-as-you-go pension system into an individual retirement accounts 
(IRA) system. She finds evidence of substantial employment reallocation between non-
covered and covered sectors suggesting that the labor supply to covered sectors is fairly 
elastic. However, she also finds evidence of a wage shift in response to a reform that ties 
benefits to taxes collected.  Decomposing the effect of the reforms into the effect of a tax 
reduction and the effect of tying benefits to contributions, she finds that increasing social 
security taxes reduces wages by 43 percent of the tax increase, while increasing benefits 
decreases wages by 57 percent of the value of benefits.   
An important factor determining the extent of wage pass-through is whether 
minimum wages bind. Maloney and Nuæez-Mendez (this volume) document that the 
minimum wage binds in Colombia. This explains the weak pass-through effects reported 
by Cardenas and Bernal (this volume) for Colombia. At the same time, the minimum wage 
is less binding, and pass-through effects may be more substantial, in Mexico and Chile, 
and this may explain the Marrufo and Gruber results. 
All in all, the available evidence suggests that at least part of the cost of non-wage 
benefits is passed on to workers in the form of lower wages, and therefore, the employment 
                                                           
19 Measuring the impact of such an ￿experiment￿ is complicated by many factors. (See the discussion in 
Edwards and Cox-Edwards, 2000). First, although payroll taxes declined, worker contributions increased.  If 
measured wage payments by firms include employee contributions, then a decline in employer-paid taxes 
will be associated with higher measured wages due to higher employee-paid contributions. Second, 
measurement error in wages biases his estimates toward finding full shifting, as he reports. The quality of his 
instruments is questionable and he is forced to make strong assumptions to circumvent a severe measurement 
error problem. Third, at a time when social security reform made work benefits more attractive, he estimates 
that wages were rising. The only way that wages can rise to match the decreased employer taxes in an 
environment with an improved link between employee contributions and benefits is if labor supply is 
perfectly inelastic to covered sector firms, which seems implausible. 37 
cost of such programs will be lower than what is predicted by the elasticity of the labor 
demand. Combining wage-shift and labor demand estimates indicates that a 10 percent 
increase in non-wage labor costs can lead to a decline in employment rates ranging 
between .6 and 4.8 percent with most of the evidence shaded toward the high end of this 
spectrum. 
Given the significance of these estimates for policy decisions, it is important to 
estimate them as accurately as possible. In this regard, the room for improvement in the 
literature is still large. As they stand, they might overestimate or underestimate the true 
employment impact depending on which of the following two effects dominates. On the 
one hand, the reported estimates are based on constant-output labor demand elasticities, 
which do not consider the employment effects of regulations through a negative effect on 
the scale of production of existing firms and on entry and exit decisions of firms. From this 
perspective, the reported range of estimates provides a lower bound on the disemployment 
effects of regulation. Moreover, the estimates of the wage shift in MacIsaac and Rama 
(1997), Mondino and Montoya (this volume) and Edwards and Cox-Edwards (1999) only 
include the cost of social security programs, but do not include the cost of other regulations 
such as job security or vacation time. Once the cost of these regulations is taken into 
account, the computed wage shift could be lower than what we report above, and, 
therefore, the estimated effects of those costs on employment would be larger.   
On the other hand, studies comparing wages of covered and non-covered workers 
performed using a cross-section of workers, such as most of the ones discussed above, may 
underestimate wage shifts and overestimate employment costs. It is necessary to model 
selection into covered sectors. This is because unobserved personal characteristics 38 
correlated with social security affiliation might explain higher wages in covered sectors.
20 
If this correlation is substantial, it will lead to an underestimation of wage differences 
between covered and uncovered workers, and hence reduce estimates of the fraction of 
wage costs shifted to workers. This concern highlights the importance of the Marrufo study 
because she controls for sectoral self-selection bias and still finds substantial evidence of 
wage shifting. If her selection adjustments to the Mexican data are typical of what would 
be found in other Latin American countries, the weight of the evidence in this book and the 
literature on firm entry in response to incentives, suggest that the studies reported in this 
volume underestimate the disemployment effects of regulation. 
 
4.2 Job Security Provisions Alter Hiring and Firing Decisions 
Regulations affecting transition costs are not adequately analyzed within a simple 
static labor-demand labor-supply framework. Dismissal costs and other regulations not 
only increase labor costs, but also alter firms￿ firing and hiring decisions. The importance 
of dismissal costs in Latin America is clearly shown in Figure 5. Whereas non-wage labor 
costs are low relative to those of OECD countries, dismissal costs tend to be very high. 
These costs make Latin American labor markets less flexible than OECD markets and 
likely impair productivity and adaptation to new technology and trade patterns as they do 
in Europe (see Heckman, 2003). It is thus important to assess the impact, if any, that such 
policies have on the functioning of the labor market.  
 
Theoretical Discussion 
                                                           
20 For instance, if workers covered by social security programs also happen to be more productive, then they 
will also have higher wages. Yet, higher wages are explained by unobserved productivity and not by social 
security affiliation.  39 
To analyze the full impact of job security provisions requires a more complex 
framework that encompasses dynamic decisions of firms. Bertola (1990) and Bentolila and 
Bertola (1990) develop dynamic partial-equilibrium models to assess how a firm￿s firing 
and hiring decisions are affected by dismissal costs. In the face of a given shock, the 
optimal employment policy of a firm involves one of three state-contingent responses: (i) 
dismissing workers, (ii) hiring workers or (iii) doing nothing. Appendix B presents a 
simple two period model of labor adjustment that summarizes the main ideas in this 
literature.  
 In the face of a negative shock and declining marginal value of labor, a firm might 
want to dismiss some workers. However, it faces a dismissal cost in most regulatory 
regimes in LAC. This cost has the effect of discouraging firms from adjusting their labor 
force, resulting in fewer dismissals than the number of dismissals that would occur in a 
scenario in the absence of such costs. Conversely, in the face of a positive shock, firms 
might want to hire additional workers but would take into account that it would be costly 
for some workers to be fired if future demand declined. This potential cost acts as a hiring 
cost, effectively reducing the creation of new jobs in a relatively healthy economy.  The 
net result is lower employment rates in expansions, higher employment rates in recessions 
and lower turnover rates as firms hire and fire fewer workers than they would in the 
absence of adjustment costs.  
Adjustment costs produce a decline in employment variability associated with 
firing costs. The implication of these models for average employment is ambiguous. In 
particular, whether average employment rates increase or decline as a result of firing costs 
depends on whether over the cycle the decline in hiring rates more than compensates for 
the reduction in dismissals. Simulations reported in Bertola (1990) and Bentolila and 40 
Bertola (1990) suggest that average employment in a given firm is likely to increase when 
firing costs increase. However, these results are quite sensitive to different assumptions 
about the persistence of shocks, the elasticity of the labor demand, the magnitude of the 
discount rate, and the functional form of the production function. Less persistent shocks 
and lower discount rates produce larger negative effects of job security on employment 
because both factors reduce hiring relative to firing (Bertola, 1992; Bentolila and Saint 
Paul, 1994). Furthermore, a higher elasticity of the demand for goods implies a larger 
negative effect of job security on employment rates. In addition, when investment 
decisions are also considered, firing costs lower profits and discourage investment, 
increasing the likelihood that they reduce the demand for labor (Risager and Sorensen, 
1997). 
The Bertola (1990) and Bertola and Bentolila (1990) analyses focus on 
employment rates in a ￿representative￿ firm without considering the impact of firing costs 
on the extensive margin, that is, on how firing costs affect the creation and destruction of 
firms. Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) develop a general equilibrium model based on the 
U.S. economy.  The partial equilibrium framework of Bertola (1990) is embedded in their 
model as part of a general equilibrium framework in which jobs and firms are created and 
destroyed in every period in response to firm-specific shocks. In the context of their model, 
Hopenhayn and Rogerson find that increasing firing costs in the U.S. would lead to an 
increase in the average employment of existing firms as a consequence of the reduction in 
firings. However, they also find that such a policy would result in lower firm entry, and 
lower job creation in newly created firms. These final two effects could potentially offset 
the increase in employment in existing firms, and they would thus reduce overall 
employment rates.   41 
The recent literature has also emphasized the possible impact of job security 
regulations on the composition of employment.  Kugler (this volume) proposes a model in 
which job security regulations provide incentives for high turnover firms to operate in the 
informal sector. This decision would entail producing at a small, less efficient scale in 
order to remain inconspicuous to tax and labor authorities. In this framework, high job 
security costs paid by formal sector firms would likely increase informality rates. PagØs 
and Montenegro (1999) develop a model in which job security provisions, which depend 
on tenure, bias employment against young workers and in favor of older ones. As 
severance pay increases with tenure, and tenure tends to increase with age, older workers 
become more costly to dismiss than younger ones. If wages do not adjust appropriately, 
negative shocks result in a disproportionate share of layoffs among young workers. 
Therefore, job security based on tenure results in lower employment rates for the young 
relative to older workers because it reduces hiring and increases layoffs for young workers. 
This effect has also been found in studies of European employment. (Heckman, 2003). 
Finally, it is important to understand that not all components of dismissal costs may 
have the same effect on employment and unemployment rates. Thus, in principle, there is 
an important conceptual distinction between advance notice and indemnities, which are 
state-contingent and affect the cost of adjustment to different states, and seniority pay 
provisions, which are paid in all states and do not affect transitions. The latter are more 
comparable to other non-wage costs such as vacation and other mandatory benefits.  
  The existing evidence regarding the impact of employment protection is abundant 
but inconclusive. Table 5 from Addison and Teixeira (2001) summarizes the current 
literature. While, Addison and Grosso (1996), Grubb and Wells (1993), Lazear (1990), 
Heckman and PagØs (2000), Nickell (1997) and Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2001) find a 42 
negative relationship between job security provisions and employment, other studies, such 
as Addison, Teixeira and Grosso (2000), OECD, (1999), Garibaldi and Mauro (1999) and 
Freeman (2001) do not find evidence of such a relationship. The evidence on the effects of 
job security on unemployment is equally ambiguous. Some studies find a positive link 
between job security and unemployment (Elmeskov, et al., 1998; Lazear, 1990; and 
Addison and Grosso, 1996) while others find no effect (Blanchard, 1998; Heckman and 
PagØs, 2000; Nickell, 1997).  Our own estimates at the end of this chapter give reasons for 
these mixed findings. All these studies are based on the analysis of aggregates of cross-
country time-series data with little variation in regulatory policies. The studies presented in 
this volume surmount some of these difficulties by studying episodes of major labor 
reform using large micro data sets.  Using disaggregated data for single countries, 
Mondino and Montoya (this volume) and Saavedra and Torero (this volume) find a large 
negative relationship between employment protection and employment. The studies 
presented in this volume contribute substantially to a literature that analyzes the 
consequences of reforms. Recent studies for OECD countries using disaggregated data 
suggest a negative effect of job security regulations on employment.  Autor et al. (2003) 
estimate the effects of recent common law wrongful discharge doctrines adopted by courts 
across states in the U.S that limit employment at will. They find that the wrongful 
discharge doctrine has a negative impact on employment to population rates in state labor 
markets.  Similarly, Kugler et al (2002) find that in Spain a combination of a reduction in 
payroll taxes and the reduction of dismissal costs increased the employment of workers on 
permanent contracts. Finally, Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), replicating the earlier work of 
Deleire (2000), examine the effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which 
outlaws discrimination against the disabled in hiring, firing and pay on the employment 43 
rate of workers with disabilities. Their findings and prior work by Deleire suggest that the 
passage of the Act reduced employment for disabled workers.   
 
Empirical Evidence for Latin America and the Caribbean 
The essays assembled in this volume assess the impact of job security regulation on 
employment and turnover rates in Latin America and the Caribbean, and provide the first 
systematic evidence of its impact on the labor market.  Several studies assess the impact of 
job security on turnover rates in the labor market. Changes in turnover are measured using 
changes in the duration of jobs (tenure), the duration of unemployment and rates of exiting 
out of employment and unemployment.
21 Higher employment exit rates indicate more 
layoffs (or more quits), while higher exit rates out of unemployment and into formal jobs 
indicate higher job creation in the formal sector. Other studies examine the impact of job 
security on employment rates. The definition of employment used in the empirical studies 
varies depending on the country being analyzed. In general, most studies focus on 
employment in large firms, although some also examine more aggregated measures of 
employment. In addition, a small group of studies also examine the impact of job security 
on the composition of employment. See Table 6 for an overview of the empirical evidence 
for Latin America and the Caribbean presented in this volume. 
 
Turnover Rates 
As predicted by most theoretical models, the bulk of empirical evidence reported in 
this volume confirms that less stringent job security tends to be associated with higher 
                                                           
21 These studies estimate hazard rates. The hazard rate is defined as the rate at which a given spell of 
employment or unemployment ends in a given period conditional on having lasted a given period of time in 
the spell (e.g., one month, one year). 44 
turnover and greater flexibility in the labor market. Kugler (this volume) analyzes the 
impact of the 1990 labor market reforms in Colombia. She finds that a reduction in job 
security costs reduces average tenure and increases employment exit rates.
22 This decline is 
significantly larger in the formal sector, which is covered by the regulations, than in the 
uncovered or informal sector. In addition, the increase is greater in large firms than in the 
smallest ones. Her results show similar patterns within tradable and non-tradable sectors, 
providing a clear indication that the decline in tenure cannot be attributed to contemporary 
trade reforms. The increasing use of temporary contracts explains only part of the increase 
in formal turnover rates since job stability also declined for workers employed at 
permanent jobs.
23  
Kugler also finds a decline in the average duration of unemployment after the 
reforms. In addition, exit rates out of unemployment increase more for workers who leave 
unemployment by going into the formal sector than they do for those who exit into 
informal jobs.  As with average tenure, her results show quite similar patterns across 
sectors and a higher exit rate toward larger firms. Finally, only two-thirds of the increase in 
the rate of entry into unemployment can be attributed to higher use of temporary contracts. 
The rest is explained by increased exit rates into permanent jobs in the formal sector.  
Saavedra and Torero (this volume) conduct a similar study, evaluating the impact 
of the 1991 reform in Peru. Like the reform in Colombia, the 1991 Peruvian reform 
considerably reduced the cost of dismissing workers. Their analysis shows a consistent 
decline in average tenure from 1991 onward, suggesting higher exit rates from 
                                                           
22 In this study tenure is measured by the duration of incomplete employment spells.  
23 In her study, Kugler performs two types of analyses. First, she uses a difference-in-difference estimator to 
analyze whether changes in average duration of employment (unemployment) are significantly different in 
the formal and informal sectors. Second, she estimates an exponential duration model to control for changes 
in demographic covariates, pooling data from before and after the reform and using interaction terms to 
assess the differential impact on the formal and informal sectors.  45 
employment. As in the Kugler study, the decline is significantly more pronounced in the 
formal sector than it is in the informal sector. In addition, the tenure patterns were quite 
similar across economic sectors, suggesting that these findings cannot be explained by the 
trade reforms that took place in the early nineties.  
In contrast to these findings, Paes de Barros and Corseuil (this volume) find little 
evidence that the substantial 1988 Brazilian Constitutional reform altered employment exit 
rates. In that year, the cost of dismissing workers was raised, and therefore a reduction in 
exit rates would be expected as a result. (Many other reforms were also put in place as 
well.) Their results indicate that aggregate employment exit rates decline in the formal 
sector relative to the informal sector for short employment spells (two years or less), but 
increase for longer spells. Their measured increase in exit rates for long spells could be 
driven by the special characteristics of the Brazilian system.  In this system, employers 
contribute 8 percent of a worker￿s wage to the worker￿s individual account. In case of 
voluntary dismissal, the worker can claim the principal, the compounded interest rate and a 
penalty paid by the firm, which in the 1988 reform was raised from 10 percent to 40 
percent of principal plus interest. In the case of a voluntary quit, the worker receives 
nothing. This asymmetry in the treatment of termination induces workers to force dismissal 
or to collude with firms to obtain the funds accumulated in the account.  It can be argued 
that the 1988 reform greatly increased the incentives to force dismissals, particularly for 
workers with longer tenures. This may explain the increase in exit rates for workers with 
longer employment spells.  
These three studies use the informal sector as a control group unaffected by the 
reforms. Their credibility hinges on the validity of this assumption. Kugler shows that 
estimates based on formal-informal sector comparisons are likely to be biased. However, 46 
such comparisons are still valid under certain conditions ￿ at least as tests of the null 
hypothesis of no effect of the reform.
24 When viewed as a whole, these studies provide 
evidence that dismissal costs and other employment protection mechanisms reduce worker 
reallocation in the labor market. Unfortunately, these studies do not identify whether 
reduced worker reallocation is due to reduced layoffs, lower quits or a mix of both.   
Some studies in this book assess the impact of regulations on the speed of 
adjustment using the length of the lag (the speed of adjustment) as an alternative measure 
of the constraints faced by firms. The intuition supporting this is based on the original 
work of Holt, Modigliani, Muth and Simon (1960). 
 Let 
*
t n be the optimal level of employment at date t determined by some implicit 
(usually static) theory. Let the cost of being out of equilibrium 
0
t c  be quadratic in 
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a
t c , which is also assumed to be quadratic in the 
adjustment from  1 t n −  to  t n  : 
(3)      . ) (
2
1 − − = t t a
a
t n n c γ                                                        
Minimizing the sum of these costs produces an optimal labor demand  t n  
                                                           
24 Kugler shows that lower severance pay may induce high-turnover informal firms to move to the formal 
sector. Assuming either no overlap in the distribution of turnover between covered and uncovered firms, or 
that entry to the covered sector comes from the high-end ￿or at least from the end that is higher than the 
formal sector, this shift results in higher turnover in both the formal and the informal sector. Higher turnover 
in the informal sector biases the difference-in-difference estimator downward. Therefore, a positive estimate 











The greater the cost of adjustment, the bigger the value of λ.  Abraham and Houseman 
(1993) and many others use this method to assess the effect of different regulatory regimes 
across countries on adjustment costs while others interact λ with measures of regulations to 
assess whether the speed of adjustment increases or declines when the regulatory 
environment is changed.  Cardenas and Bernal (this volume), Paes de Barros and Corseuil 
(this volume) and Saavedra and Torero (this volume) use this methodology to examine 
whether the speed of adjustment increased or declined after labor reforms. In the study of 
Saavedra and Torero, their estimated interaction term suggests that more stringent 
regulations reduce the speed of adjustment, particularly in the pre-reform period, when 
regulation was very stringent. In the other two studies, this methodology is unable to 
identify any changes in adjustment due to reforms.  This is particularly relevant in the 
study of CÆrdenas and Bernal on Colombia since other methodologies based on duration 
data (Kugler, this volume) show clear effects of regulation on adjustment.  Addison and 
Teixeira (2001) indicate that ￿none of the implementations of this (adjustment cost) model 
in core OECD countries were able to detect a discernible impact of job security regulations 
on the speed of employment adjustment￿.  In the concluding section of this paper, we 
discuss why the lag coefficient is not a reliable measure of the regulatory costs, especially 
when applied to cross country data.  
Average Employment  
1
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The available evidence for LAC countries shows a consistent, although not always 
statistically significant, negative impact of JS provisions on average employment rates. 
Saavedra and Torero (this volume) and Mondino and Montoya (this volume) use firm-level 
panel data to estimate the impact of job security on employment in Peru and Argentina, 
respectively.  Both studies estimate labor demand equations in which an explicit measure 
of job security appears on the right hand side of the equation, and both find evidence that 
higher job security levels are associated with lower employment rates.
25 In the case of 
Peru, Saavedra and Torero find that the size of the impact of regulations is correlated with 
the magnitude of the regulations themselves. Thus, the impact is very high at the beginning 
of their sample (1987-1990), coinciding with a period of very high dismissal costs (see 
their Table 4). Afterward, and coinciding with a period of deregulation, the magnitude of 
the estimated coefficient declines after a new increase in dismissal costs, only to increase 
again from 1995 onward. Their estimates for the long-run elasticities of severance pay are 
very large  (in absolute value). Between 1987 and 1990 a 10 percent increase in dismissal 
costs is estimated to reduce long-run employment rates by 11 percent, keeping wages 
constant. In subsequent periods, the size of the effect becomes smaller but is still quite 
large in magnitude (between 3 and 6 percent). In Argentina, the estimated long-run 
elasticity of a 10 percent increase in dismissal costs is also between 3 and 6 percent. 
26  
                                                           
25 The data for the Peruvian study covers firms with more than 10 employees in all sectors of the economy. 
The Argentinean study only covers manufacturing firms. Given the nature of these surveys,  these studies 
analyze formal employment rather than employment as a whole. The data used in these two studies does not 
capture job creation by new firms, since both panels are based on a given balanced panel census of firms, 
which does not adjust for attrition.  
26 The methodology used by these studies might lead to upward biased estimates of the elasticity of 
employment to job security. Thus, for example, Mondino and Montoya construct explicit measures of job 
security based on:   
    JSjt= δj TjtPjt SPjt  
Where δj  is the average layoff rate in sector j, Tjt  is average tenure in sector j, for a time period t, Pjt  is the 
share of firms in sector j, time period t that are covered by regulations  and SPjt   is the mandatory severance 
pay in sector j, given average tenure Tjt .  This measure provides variability across sectors and periods, and 
therefore it yields a more precise estimation of the impact of job security than before-after types of 49 
Kugler (this volume) computes the net impact of the Colombian 1991 labor reform 
on unemployment rates.  Using unemployment and employment exit rate estimates before 
and after the reform, she finds that the reforms cause a decline in unemployment between 
1.3 and 1.7 percentage points. Thus, as in Mondino and Montoya (this volume) and 
Saavedra and Torero (this volume), Kugler￿s estimates of the impact of deregulation 
indicate that the positive impact of reduced labor costs on hiring outweighs the negative 
impact of reduced severance costs on firing, resulting in a decline in unemployment rates.  
Heckman and PagØs￿ (2000) analysis of cross section-time series aggregates also 
finds evidence of a negative impact of employment protection on employment. However, 
the evidence presented at the end of this chapter suggests that their results for Latin 
America are not robust although their results for OECD Europe are robust.  The fragility of 
their estimates for Latin America based on aggregate data suggests the value of using more 
disaggregated data in reaching sharp conclusions. 
Other studies find negative, but statistically less precisely estimated, effects of job 
security on average employment rates. PagØs and Montenegro (1999) find that JS has a 
negative but statistically insignificant effect on overall wage-employment rates in Chile. 
Similarly, Marquez (1998), using a cross-section sample of Latin American and OECD 
countries, finds a negative but insignificant coefficient of job security on aggregate 
employment rates. Table 6 summarizes the various estimates of job security on 
employment.  
Downes et al (this volume) also use aggregate time series data to examine changes 
in the labor demand associated with changes in the regulatory framework in three 
                                                                                                                                                                                
comparisons. Yet, such a measure may also be correlated with the error term in a labor demand equation 
since both layoffs and  the tenure structure of a firm might be correlated with its employment level. However, 50 
Caribbean countries. Their inconclusive results are typical of an entire literature. They use 
an indicator variable that measures periods with more or less stringent regulations. Their 
estimates do not capture changes in labor demand before and after the reform. However, as 
in the case in most of the OECD-based literature, their sample variation in regulations and 
institutions may be too limited and the level of aggregation too great to capture any effects 
of regulation on employment. 
 
The Composition of Employment  
Economists have paid relatively more attention to studying the effects of job 
security on the level of employment and unemployment than to studying the effects of 
such policies on the distribution of jobs.  However, a few studies shed some light on the 
impact of job security on the composition of employment in LAC. Marquez (1998) 
constructs a ranking of the relative severity of labor market regulations (including 
workweek, contract and other regulations besides job security provisions) for LAC and 
OECD countries and uses it to estimate the effects of JS on the formal/informal 
distribution of employment. He finds that across countries more stringent regulations 
coincide with a larger percentage of self-employed workers. In a study of Chile, 
Montenegro and PagØs (this volume) use repeated cross-section micro-data spanning forty 
years of data and substantial variation in labor market policies.  They control for year 
effects that are common across workers, as well as for the differential effects of the 
business cycle, and other labor market policies on each demographic group. They find that 
more stringent job security measures reduce the employment rates of youth and the 
unskilled, while increasing the employment rates of older and skilled workers. Their 
                                                                                                                                                                                
robustness analyses reported in Mondino and Montoya  suggest that not considering some of this variability 51 
results also suggest that job security regulations increase the self employment of women 
and unskilled workers, relative to other demographic groups. This evidence is consistent 
with evidence in Bertola (2001) and Heckman (2003) that job security provisions protect 
the relatively privileged workers at the expense of the less advantaged ones. In a review of 
the recent OECD literature, relying on cross-country, time-series analysis, Addison and 
Teixeira (2001) reach similar conclusions stating that while prime-age male employment 
rates have not been affected by job security provisions, the employment rates of other 
groups, most notably younger workers, have been affected. 
 
4.3 Temporary Contracts 
  Hopenhayn (this volume) discusses the impact of temporary contracts on the 
Argentine labor market. Such contracts were introduced following the Spanish model. He 
finds that these contracts induce an increase in hiring and a substitution away from long-
term employment toward short-term employment. So, in the short-run, these contracts 
remove one barrier from the labor market and make it more fluid. At the same time, they 
tend to promote turnover. Hopenhayn finds that the average hazard rate for the first three 
months out of employment increased by 30 percent and for tenure above three months by 
10 percent. While temporary contracts promote fluidity, they reduce firm attachment and 
the incentive of firms to invest in workers. Alonso-Borrego and Aguirregabiria (1999) 
document that in Spanish labor markets, the effect of temporary contracts is to reduce 
investment in workers and hence to produce lower quality (less skilled) workers in the long 
run. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
still produces positive and statistically significant estimates for the coefficient of the job security measure.  52 
4.4 Minimum Wages 
  Maloney and Nuæez-Mendez (this volume) present novel estimates of the impact of 
minimum wages on wage distributions and employment. Their evidence demonstrates 
convincingly that minimum wages are binding in most Latin American countries and have 
substantial effects on employment and wage distributions. An important finding in their 
analysis is that both covered and uncovered sectors (￿formal￿ and ￿informal￿ sectors) 
respond in similar fashion to wage minimums. The informal sector does not show the 
downward wage flexibility that traditional models of labor market dualism predict. 
Another important finding is that minimum wages percolate much more widely across 
wage distributions in Latin America than they do in the U.S. There are substantial effects 
of minimum wages on wages far up in the distribution of wages. Their study puts to rest 
the claim that minimum wages are innocuous, even in countries with large ￿informal￿ 
sectors.  
  Montenegro and PagØs (this volume) study the effects of minimum wages on the 
distribution of employment in Chile. They find that, like job security provisions, minimum 
wages reduce the employment probabilities of the young and the unskilled relative to older 
and more skilled workers. Not surprisingly, as suggested in other studies for developed 
countries, their results indicate that minimum wages are particularly binding for young 
unskilled workers. However, their results also indicate an adverse effect of the minimum 
wage on prime-age unskilled workers. Minimum wages adversely affect disadvantaged 
workers of all ages.    
We next turn to a pooled time series cross-country study of the impact of regulation 
on employment. The fragility and sensitivity of the estimates for the Latin American 
region that we find highlight the benefits of the microdata analysis reported in this volume. 53 
 
5. Evidence from A Cross-Section Time-Series Sample of LAC and OECD Countries 
  In this section, we summarize and expand on some of the main results of our recent 
work, updating our earlier paper (Heckman and Pages, 2000). We use time series of cross-
sections of countries and we exploit the substantial variability in labor laws in Latin 
America to estimate their effects on employment and unemployment. These studies serve 
to place the essays in this volume within the broader context of a literature that almost 
exclusively focuses on time series of cross section averages of countries. Unfortunately, 
few empirical regularities emerge when an honest sensitivity analysis is conducted. 
Nonetheless a few robust regularities do appear. Payroll taxes reduce employment and 
(less robustly) in OECD countries, job security regulation reduces employment. 
 
The Data 
Labor market studies focusing on developing countries are hampered by serious data 
problems. Thus, labor market variables contained in most cross-country databases suffer 
from a lack of comparability and reliability. To overcome these problems, we construct a 
new data set that includes OECD and LAC countries. For OECD countries, we collect 
employment and unemployment data from the OECD statistics. For the Latin American 
sample, we directly construct the same indicators out of a large set of Latin American 
Household Surveys. See Appendix A for a more detailed description of the employment 
and unemployment variables as well as the countries and years used to obtain the LAC 
data. Population variables are obtained from the UN Population database while GDP 
measures are from the World Bank Development Indicators. To characterize labor market 54 
regulations we use the set of measures summarized in Table 4, but defined for each year 
and country.  
Our joint sample collects more than 400 data points from 38 countries; 23 in the OECD 
and 15 in LA. (Mexico is included in the Latin America sample although it belongs to the 
OECD). We analyze country means and do not disaggregate further. The sample is an 
unbalanced panel covering the period 1983-1999. Table 7 reports summary statistics of our 
data for both our whole sample and for the sub-regional ones. There are large differences 
between the OECD and the LAC samples. GDP per capita measures tend to be 
substantially lower in the LAC than in the OECD region. Conversely, GDP growth is 
lower in the latter. Indemnities for dismissal and seniority pay are higher in Latin America 
than in OECD countries while advance notice provisions and social security contributions 
are lower. There are important differences in labor market aggregates as well. On average, 
employment rates are higher in the LAC region than in OECD countries. The reverse is 
true for unemployment rates.  The LAC region also displays a lower percentage of the 
working age population in the 25 to 54 and the 55 to 65 years old brackets than OECD 
countries and a higher share of the population in the 15 to 24 years age group. By 
constructing our own data set from individual household-level surveys, we are guaranteed 
that all of the labor market variables are comparable and reliable.  One drawback of our 
data is that for the LAC sample, we only have a few time series observations per country 
(usually six or seven), and not necessarily from consecutive years.  
Our objective is to relate our measures of regulations to employment and 
unemployment outcomes. Although we perform multivariate analyses, it is interesting to 
examine the bivariate relationship between regulations and employment. This is 
particularly easy for regulations such as job security provisions that, within our sample, 55 
change at most once or twice per country.  In figures 8 and 9, we graph employment before 
and after reforms for countries that experienced job security reforms. The graphs for LAC 
should be interpreted with caution because they have been interpolated from incomplete 
time series data. 
  There is little evidence that reforms that reduced job security increased 
employment rates in Colombia.  There is also not much evidence that reforms that 
increased job security had a deleterious effect on employment in Brazil, Chile or 
Nicaragua.  However, there is some evidence indicating that reforms that liberalized labor 
markets in Peru increased employment rates, while reforms that increased labor market 
rigidities reduced employment.  For Germany, our data suggest that employment declined 
at a slower rate after a reform that increased job security, while in Spain and UK the 
opposite seems to be true after liberalization. These figures suggest that periods of less 
stringent job security regulations coincide with higher employment rates in some countries, 
while the reverse is also true in other countries. The data presented in these figures, 
however, fail to control for contemporaneous changes in economic activity or other factors 
that could be correlated with employment and labor reforms. In the next section, we 
perform an empirical analysis in an attempt to control for contemporaneous effects that 
may be correlated with reforms, employment and unemployment outcomes. 
 
Methodology and Results 
To relate labor market regulations to employment and unemployment outcomes, we 
estimate the following model: 
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where Yit is a labor market variable (employment or unemployment) of country i at period 
t, αi  denotes a country fixed effect, Xit denotes a vector of employment regulation 
variables, git, and   it GDPPC  denote GDP growth and (log of) GDP per capita, respectively, 
Zit is a vector of demographic controls and  it ε  is a mean zero error. 
 Given the nature of the data with incomplete gaps, we decided not to average 
observations from a given period to control for business cycle effects, as is often done in 
OECD studies. Instead, we control for the state of the business cycle in a given year using 
GDP growth
27.  Although a large part of our variation is cross-sectional, we use fixed 
effects estimates to control for unobserved variables that may be correlated with measures 
of regulation across countries. In addition, we control for demographic changes that may 
be correlated with employment and unemployment rates as well as regulatory variables 
that change over time. Finally, we use GDP per capita (adjusted by PPP) to control for 
differences in levels of country economic activity across years.
28  We estimate a reduced 
form model to investigate whether periods of high non-wage labor costs stemming from 
advance notice, indemnities for dismissal, severance pay or social security contributions 
are associated with lower employment or higher unemployment rates. We thus estimate an 
average net effect of labor laws as they operate through intermediate variables, which we 
do not include in the regression. We do not estimate a theoretically more appropriate state-
contingent labor demand specification because we lack the information on the firm-
specific state of the product market confronting individual firms. Therefore, we only 
attempt to identify the effect of labor laws through their effect on expected (across labor 
                                                           
27 GDP growth is obtained from the World Bank Development indicators.  It turns out that deleting or 
including this variable has no important effect on our empirical conclusions.  Deleting or including GDP per 
capita (PPP adjusted) does not alter our results, either. 57 
market states) labor cost.  This is a severe limitation. However, what we offer is an 
improvement over the existing literature on cross-country time series that does not quantify 
labor costs. Appendix B discusses conceptually more appropriate specifications of labor 
demand functions. 
Table 8A displays our estimates for employment in the overall and regional 
samples. In these and subsequent results, we compute standard errors that are robust to 
heteroscedasticity.  Throughout this analysis, we extend social security data to yearly 
frequencies since this information is only available biannually. We do so either by 
interpolating or by inputting each missing data values with the value from the former year.  
The results of our empirical analysis are robust across methods. The results do not vary 
either when we consider only the original biennial data. However, in this case, the number 
of available observations drops substantially. 
The coefficients on GDP growth have the expected positive signs and are 
statistically significant for the overall sample. The coefficients on the demographic 
variables are positive, suggesting that countries with larger percentages of their working 
age population above age 25 tend to have higher employment rates. However, none of the 
coefficients on the demographic variables are statistically significant at conventional 
levels.  A higher GDP per capita tends to coincide with higher employment to population 
rates. However, this estimated effect is not precisely determined. 
  Our main interest is on measuring the effect of the labor market regulations. We 
find that once we expand our sample to include a larger number of OECD and LAC 
countries, the strong negative effect on employment of indemnities for dismissal reported 
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for the pooled sample in Heckman and PagØs (2000) disappears. This is somewhat 
surprising because not only do we expand the set of countries and periods for which we 
can construct the measure, but we also revise some of the variables used in our previous 
analysis to more accurately model the laws. We still estimate a negative, statistically 
significant, coefficient for indemnities in the OECD specification and this is an important 
contribution to the European debate on the impact of regulations. This evidence suggests a 
significant lack of robustness of the estimated effect of regulations that we explore in 
detail.  
With regard to the rest of the regulations, we find a positive although not 
statistically significant coefficient on advance notice cost both in the joint and in the sub-
regional samples.  Since seniority pay regulations only exist in Latin America, we cannot 
identify the impact of these regulations in the OECD sample. However, we find positive 
coefficients for this variable both in the LAC and in the pooled sample. Moreover, the 
coefficient in the joint sample is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The 
estimated coefficient suggests that an increase in payments equivalent to one month￿s pay 
(in expected present value) increases employment rates by 1.12 percentage points.  One 
might argue that the strong association between contributions and benefits associated with 
these types of schemes contributes to an expansion of labor supply increasing overall 
employment rates. However, the coefficients on advance notice and on indemnities are also 
positive. In contrast to these results, our estimates suggest a negative effect of social 
security contributions on employment both in the joint and the sub-regional samples. 
(Recall this is the total contribution of employers and workers). This effect is statistically 
significant. According to our estimates, a reduction in the social security contributions 
from the OECD to the LAC average (see Table 4) would increase employment by 3.25 59 
percentage points for the coefficients from the joint sample or by 4.26 points if the OECD 
coefficient is used (table 8a, columns (1) and (6), respectively).    
Since there is substantial correlation among our measures of labor market 
regulation, we also estimate specifications that include these measures one at a time.
29 The 
number of observations used in each regression varies because there are countries for 
which we do not have information for all the regulation measures. The results are 
unchanged if we restrict all regressions to have the same observations than the ones used in 
column (1). Adding the regulation measures separately tends to produce smaller 
coefficients for each of them, suggesting that there are important complementarities that 
are not captured by the one-at-a-time specifications. We strongly reject the hypothesis that 
the four measures are not jointly significant  (last row, Table 8A) and therefore include 
them together in the remaining analysis.  
Table 8B presents the estimates for unemployment. As for employment, 
indemnities for dismissal have a strong positive effect on unemployment in the OECD 
sample but no effect in the Latin America or the joint sample. The coefficient on advance 
notice is negative in the overall and OECD samples, but not in the LAC sample. However 
the coefficient is not statistically significant in any sample. The coefficient on seniority pay 
is also positive, suggesting that these schemes increase labor supply. However, the 
coefficient is not statistically significant. Finally, and consistent with our results on 
employment, we find that higher social security contributions are associated with higher 
levels of unemployment in the three samples considered. Our point estimates suggest that 
reducing social security contributions from the OECD to the LAC average reduces 
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.15 and .21 (in absolute value) and statistically significant. Social security contributions are positively and 60 
unemployment by 2.54 percentage points if we use the estimate for the joint sample or 3.11 
points if we use the OECD one. As with the case of employment, adding the regulatory 
measures one-at-a-time produces smaller coefficients for each of the measures. As before, 
we reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of the four variables are jointly equal to zero, 
and therefore we will include them in the rest of the unemployment analysis. 
  Our results in Tables 8A-8B suggest that not all regulations have the same effect on 
employment and unemployment rates. Since all regulations are measured in multiples of 
monthly wages we can compare the coefficients of the four regulations studied and assess 
whether they have similar effects. In Table 9 we report the results of testing the hypothesis 
of equality of coefficients. We reject the null hypothesis of identical coefficients for the 
four measures in the employment, but not the unemployment, specifications.  Interestingly, 
we are also able to reject the hypothesis that social security payments exert the same effect 
on employment as seniority pay, despite the fact that both variables imply mandatory 
contributions defined as fraction of wages. Perhaps because contributions to finance 
seniority pay are capitalized in individual accounts, the link between contributions and 
payments is strengthened, and this reduces or eliminates the ￿tax￿ effect. Instead, our 
results suggest that social security contributions tend to be perceived as taxes on labor and 
therefore reduce the demand of labor above and beyond a possible reduction in the supply 
of labor.  Moreover, we reject the hypothesis that indemnities for dismissal and seniority 
pay have the same coefficient or that all components of job security (advance notice, 
indemnities for dismissal and seniority pay) have the same coefficient.  When we impose 
this (incorrect) constraint on the data, we obtain a positive and statistically significant 
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coefficient, while the coefficient on social security regulations remains negative and 
statistically significant. 
Finally, although we reject the hypothesis that all four regulations have the same 
effect on employment, imposing this constraint yields a negative, statistically significant 
coefficient on employment and a positive, statistically significant coefficient on 
unemployment. Moreover, the size of the coefficients is very similar to the ones reported 
in Table 8.A and 8.B for social security.  This is not surprising, since social security 
regulations constitute the lion￿s share of the total cost of regulations. 
In summary, our results suggest that not all regulations have the same effect on 
employment rates. Thus, while social security contributions are negatively associated with 
employment (and positively associated with unemployment), the effect of job security 
measures on employment is ambiguous.  While in the joint and LAC samples, advance 
notice and indemnities for dismissal have positive, although not statistically significant 
coefficients, the coefficient on indemnities in the OECD sample is negative and 
statistically significant at conventional levels. Seniority pay is positively associated with 
employment and the coefficients on this variable are statistically significant in most 
specifications.  We also reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on seniority pay and the 
coefficients on the rest of the components of job security are the same.  These differences 
in results across regions, specifications and samples, relative to our previous work, suggest 
a lack of robustness that we further explore. Before turning to a robustness analysis, we 
first consider the evidence on the shifting of the payroll tax. 
 
Wage shifts  62 
What is the estimated wage pass-through implied by our coefficients on social 
security contributions? The social security effect is a robust finding of our aggregate 
country analysis and so is worth exploring further. Define α as the elasticity of 
employment with respect to the cost of labor.  Assume that social security taxes are 
expressed as a percentage of wages.  Writing labor demand as a function of wages 
inclusive of taxes in log linear form, we obtain: 
() () ( ) ln ln 1 Emp SS W SS SS C α =+ +    
where SS is the fraction of wages marked up by social security and W(SS) is the wage 
which depends on SS through equilibrium shifting effects and C is a constant standing in 
for all other factors.  Taking derivatives with respect to the SS markup, we obtain:  
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from a specification with the same 
control variables as the specification reported in table 8.A, column 1, but where the 
dependent variable is in logs, advance notice, indemnities for dismissal and seniority pay 
are defined in logs and social security contributions are defined as fractions of gross wages 







 is assumed to be within the ranges 63 
of estimates reported in Table 4 and consistent with the estimates reported in these studies. 
With all of these elements, we obtain the estimates presented in Table 10.
30   
We find that the elasticity of employment with respect to social security 
contributions is -.7 for the whole sample, around ￿1 for the OECD sample and -.447 for 
Latin America.  This implies that increasing social security contributions by 10 percent 
will lower employment by 7 percent in the overall sample, 10 percent in the OECD and 4.5 
percent in Latin America.  These are large numbers.  They also imply that for a large range 
of labor demand elasticities the estimated pass through is zero, particularly for the OECD 
sample.  Thus, for a labor demand elasticity of -.7, the pass through is zero in OECD and 
36 percent in LA.  Although this larger pass through in Latin America is at odds with the 
presumption of a very elastic labor supply to the formal sector, it is consistent with a much 
higher wage flexibility in Latin America than in industrial countries due to greater inflation 
in the region (see IADB, 2003).  All in all, this evidence suggests that part of the cost of 
regulations is borne by workers, but that social security contributions tend to be perceived 
as taxes on labor.  Increasing social security taxes leads to substantial costs in terms of 
reductions in employment and increases in unemployment. 
 
The effect of recent social security reforms 
Our negative coefficients on social security contributions suggest that the benefits 
associated with these contributions are valued at less than 100 percent of their cost. An 
interesting question is whether the recent wave of pension reforms in Latin America have 
contributed to strengthen the link between contributions and benefits as well as to increase 
the size of the wage pass-through. This is especially relevant because most reforms 
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transformed pay-as-you-go systems into full or partial capitalization systems. To examine 
this possibility we create a dummy variable Reform, which, for each country, takes the 
value of zero in the period pre-reform and 1 from the period of reform onward. We add this 
variable and an interaction of reform with the cost of social security payments to the 
specification given by expression (2). Our results suggest contemporaneous positive effects 
of pension reforms on employment. (See Table 11) However, it is unclear whether this 
positive effect is associated with the reforms themselves or with other factors. Thus, we 
find a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the Reform variable, suggesting an 
increase in employment rates in the post-reform period. However, the interaction term with 
social security reform is negative and statistically significant, indicating that social security 
taxes have larger disemployment effects after the reforms. This higher disincentive could 
be due to the mixed effects resulting from the transition to the new system. As workers 
move from the pay-as-you-go to the capitalization system, contributions to social security 
finance individual accounts and, in many instances, the pensions of those left in the old 




The results reported in this section are based on larger samples and depart 
substantially from those reported in Heckman and PagØs (2000).
31 Unfortunately, a lack of 
robustness to changes in specification or sample size is all too common in the cross-section 
time-series literature that uses aggregate data. However, fragility is not the entire story. 
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31 We are greatly indebted to David Bravo and Sergio Urzua, who made us aware that adding Chile to the 
original sample used in Heckman and PagØs (2000) substantially changes our earlier conclusions. 65 
The estimated payroll tax effects are robust as are the negative effects of indemnities on 
employment. Given this potential weakness, we investigate whether our new results are 
robust to changes in estimation method, measures of regulations, specification and sample 
size, as well as to the exclusion of outliers.   
Given the limited variance of the job security variables, it is interesting to compare 
our fixed effects coefficients with the results obtained from estimating our main equation 
using random effects (RE) (see Table 12) We reject the hypothesis of consistency of the 
RE estimator for employment in the joint sample at 10 percent.  The most substantial 
difference is the considerably smaller magnitude of the coefficient on indemnities for the 
OECD sample in the RE model. While in the OECD sample we still find a negative effect 
of indemnities on employment and a positive effect on unemployment, these effects are no 
longer statistically significant at conventional levels.  The coefficient on advance notice is 
now positive and statistically significant in the employment regressions and negative and 
statistically significant in the unemployment regressions. The size and significance of the 
social security contribution coefficients are robust to the change in method of estimation. 
In unreported results available upon request, we also examine whether our results 
are robust to alternative measurements of the cost of regulations that do not require 
assumptions about discount or layoff rates. Following Lazear (1990), we measure job 
security regulations as the mandatory amount (in multiples of monthly wages) that should 
be paid to a worker who is dismissed after 10 years of tenure. A major disadvantage of this 
measure is that it only reflects job security in one point of the job security-tenure schedule. 
In our samples both his measure and our measure yield similar results.  
We also assess the sensitivity of our results to the inclusion or exclusion of 
additional control variables such as year effects, region-specific year effects, time trends 66 
and region-specific time trends. The results on the effect of social security contributions on 
employment and unemployment are very robust to changes in specification.  Other results 
are less robust.  For instance, in a specification with region-specific year fixed-effects the 
coefficient on seniority pay is still positive but it is no longer statistically significant at 
conventional levels. Adding or deleting either g or GDP levels does not change our 
conclusions. 
Important differences also arise when we assess the sensitivity of our baseline 
results to changes in sample size. In particular, we find that both the coefficients on 
advance notice provisions and indemnities for dismissal are sensitive to the 
inclusion/exclusion of some countries in the sample while the coefficients on social 
security payments and seniority pay do not change. For instance, excluding Germany from 
the sample greatly increases the coefficient on advance notice in the baseline employment 
specification. Similarly, excluding Brazil or Peru changes the coefficient on indemnities 
for dismissal in the employment regressions. 
  Finally, we check whether our results are robust to the exclusion of outliers, which 
are defined as those observations for which the difference in the regression coefficient 
when the i-th observation is included and when it is not, scaling the difference by the 
estimated standard error of the coefficient, is larger than 2 n  (Belsley, et al., 1980).  Our 
results confirm that there are no outliers that alter the coefficients for social security 
contributions. There are a few outliers that modify the coefficients on job security 
provisions (advance notice, indemnities and seniority pay). However, they do not 
qualitatively alter our baseline results.  
 Taken as a whole, our results suggest that the negative (and statistically 
significant) association between social security contributions and employment, as well as a 67 
positive association between social security contributions and unemployment is very 
robust to changes in estimation method, specification, regional sample, sample size and 
outliers. The coefficients on our job security measures are much less robust.  Thus, while 
the FE estimates provide some evidence that in some OECD countries reducing 
indemnities results in higher employment rates, the evidence across countries provided by 
our RE estimates is less conclusive. One component of job security, seniority pay, is 
positively correlated with employment.  
 
Endogeneity 
It is often argued that labor reforms are put in place when labor market 
performance is poor. As demonstrated in the Figure 3 plots, this is sometimes true for 
reforms in the LAC region. If a decline in employment rates (and an increase in 
unemployment rates) prompts a reduction in labor market regulations, then least squares 
estimates will be upward biased, potentially underestimating a negative relationship 
between job security or social security taxes and employment.  Our baseline specification 
partly controls for the possibility of such reverse causality because the propensity for 
reform is partly captured by changes in the GDP or demographic conditions. Another 
source of concern is the timing of reforms. If labor reforms that liberalize the labor market 
are undertaken at particularly bad times, an estimated negative relationship between 
employment and regulations could just be the consequence of mean reversion.  
In the results available on request, we address these issues in various ways. First, 
we attempt to control for differences in the propensity to reform at different points in time 
by including current and past GDP rates up to five lags. Since presumably, bad 
employment outcomes are strongly associated with poor GDP outcomes, the inclusion of 68 
this set of variables will control for the propensity to reform. Secondly, we control for the 
timing of reforms by interacting changes in regulatory variables with a variable that 
measures the distance (in years) between the current year and the last business cycle 
trough. Finally, we directly address the problem of reverse causality by using the 
dependency ratio, defined as the ratio of population 65 and older to the population in 
working age (15 to 64), as an instrument for social security contributions.
32 Our results 
suggest that controlling for either the propensity or the timing of reforms does not alter the 
conclusions of our analysis.
33  
Regarding our instrumental variable estimates, Table 13 indicates that in the three 
samples considered, social security contributions increase with the dependency ratio. In 
addition, demographic changes explain a substantial share of the within-country time 
variation in social security contributions.  The average dependency ratio in our sample is 
0.17, while in OECD and LA are 0.19 and 0.08 respectively.  The coefficients in Table 13 
suggest that if the dependency ratio increases in one percentage point, expected discounted 
social security contributions increase in 1.12 months for the total sample, 1.02 for the 
OECD and 2.83 for Latin America. Moreover, our instrumental variable estimates (Table 
14) suggest that there is a causal relation between changes in social security contributions 
and changes in employment and unemployment rates at least in the overall and OECD 
sample. In these two samples, IV estimates produce larger coefficients than the FE 
regressions.  Instead, the Latin America IV estimates yield coefficients with opposite signs 
to the ones obtained with the FE regressions. However, such coefficients are not 
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33 Another way to control for endogeneity is to use the information in the Figure 3 sequence to break out 
episodes of reform that were not preceded by major downturns (or upturns) of the economy from other 
episodes and analyze the latter. The problem with this approach in our sample is that it uses up too many 
scarce degrees of freedom.   69 
statistically significant.  The small number of observations available for Latin America is 
not sufficient to obtain precise IV estimates in this region.  
Summary 
  Our analysis of pooled time-series cross-sections of countries underscores why the 
studies examining the impact of regulations in OECD countries based on such data have 
produced such ambiguous results. Lack of variation in the relevant policy measures and 
poor measures of regulation have hampered empirical analyses of the effect of regulations 
on labor market outcomes. To surmount these problems we have expanded the number of 
countries comprising the LAC region, included more within-country variation, and 
improved the measures of regulation. Contrary to previously reported estimates, we have 
found little evidence of a systematic relationship between advance notice and indemnities 
for dismissal on employment or unemployment in our improved and expanded sample for 
Latin America. Estimates vary across countries with some countries showing gains in 
employment after reducing job security, and others showing little benefit to the 
employment rate or even employment reductions after such reforms, but no clear pattern 
emerges from the aggregates.   
However, we find robust evidence that social security contributions are not fully 
shifted to workers. Payroll taxation tends to reduce employment and increase 
unemployment rates across samples and specifications. At the aggregate level, our analyses 
of reforms intended to increase the link between contributions and payments show mixed 
results. 
 
6. Conclusions and Directions for Future Research 70 
Summarizing an entire school of thought, Freeman (2000) writes that ￿the 
institutional organization of the labor market has identifiable large effects on distribution, 
but modest hard-to-uncover effects on efficiency.￿ This view is shared by many 
economists. However, the microevidence summarized in this volume suggests that 
mandated benefits and job security regulations have a substantial allocative impact both in 
Latin America and in OECD countries. 
  What policy lessons can be drawn from the essays in this volume? The evidence 
assembled in this volume suggests that labor market regulations are an inequality-
increasing mechanism, because some workers benefit while many others are hurt. The 
benefits of programs funded with mandatory payroll contributions should be weighed 
against their costs in terms of employment. Funding such programs with general revenues 
does not necessarily reduce employment costs (see Nickell, 1997), but strengthening the 
link between payments and benefits contributes to shifting the cost of such programs to 
workers, at least in the long run. Regulation acts unevenly across different groups in 
society. Young, uneducated, and rural workers are much less likely to enjoy coverage than 
older, skilled and urban workers.  
While the aggregate evidence on the effects of job security on the level of 
employment is inconclusive, the microstudies assembled here find a large and negative 
effect of job security on employment. Individual country studies based on microdata 
reduce the fragility and lack of robustness problems that pervade the cross-section of 
countries time-series literature.  
 
Lessons For Future Research 71 
  While these essays demonstrate that firms and workers respond to incentives in 
predictable ways, and that regulation reduces employment and labor market turnover, more 
precise quantitative estimates would be desirable. We conclude with a discussion of the 
main areas in which future research could improve upon the current estimates.   
(a) Incidence of Payroll Taxes and General Equilibrium 
Several essays in this volume take significant steps towards addressing whether 
workers accept lower wages if they receive mandated benefits. These estimates of 
incidence can be improved. Comparing the wages of covered and uncovered sectors to see 
if covered workers get lower wages, as in Cardenas and Bernal (this volume) and several 
other essays in this volume, fails to control for self-selection into these sectors which 
several studies in this volume have documented to be important. The method fails to adjust 
for general equilibrium effects arising from induced entry and exit and the willingness of 
workers to purchase benefits by accepting reduced wages. 
The most comprehensive approach to the incidence question is the analysis of Marrufo 
(2001), which finds that controlling for self-selection and accounting for general 
equilibrium effects substantially affects estimates of tax incidence and difference-in-
difference estimates understate the true extent of wage adjustment. As argued by Kugler, 
the simple difference-in-differences method is downward biased so that the estimates 
reported in this volume are conservative. 
(b) Dynamic Labor Demand 
The empirical models of labor demand estimated by the authors in this volume are 
traditional static models and dynamic labor demand models based on the assumption of 
symmetric adjustment costs. They abstract from the asymmetries in labor demand that are 
produced by severance and indemnity systems. Appendix B sketches out the main ideas in 72 
the asymmetric demand literature using a two-period model. Alonso-Borrego and 
Aguirregabiria (1999) develops the econometrics needed to estimate such models but the 
methods remain to be implemented on LAC data. Given that all of the labor demand 
models estimated in this book assume symmetric adjustment costs, it would be productive 
to rework these studies using more advanced methods. As previously noted, the 
inconclusive evidence on the effect of job security on firm adjustment dynamics may be an 
artifact of the symmetry assumption. 
  In this class of models, it would also be useful to account for general equilibrium 
effects of entry and exit of firms. Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) demonstrate that in 
principle accounting for general equilibrium effects can reverse the predictions of partial 
equilibrium models.  
(c) Accounting for Nonstationarity 
  All of the duration models used to determine the impacts of regulation on labor 
market turnover assume stationary environments. Any student of Latin America knows 
how poor that assumption is. The high volatility of economic outcomes in Latin America 
suggests that this assumption does not adequately characterize the region. Accounting for 
nonstationarity more systematically would improve econometric estimates of behavioral 
parameters for the region.  
(d) Accounting for The Effects of Regulation on Output 
  All the labor demand studies estimate output-constant wage elasticities. Abstracting 
from the potentially important econometric problem of endogeneity of output, output-
constant demand functions are more robust because they allow the analyst to abstract from 
product market adjustments to relative price changes. At the firm level, the output-constant 
effects of regulation understate the total effect of regulation if regulation raises the 73 
marginal cost of labor to the firm and costs cannot be shifted onto wages or other factor 
costs. The estimates reported here underestimate the full disemployment effects of 
deregulation in sectors adversely impacted. At the level of the national economy, the 
effects are more ambiguous because the burden of regulation may impact industries 
differently although it will still have efficiency losses by distorting sectoral allocations. In 
a closed economy, relative output prices adjust and will lead to an expansion of output in 
those sectors least impacted. So in those sectors, greater regulation may lead to greater 
employment. In an open economy facing world prices, when regulations are not 
accommodated by a downward adjustment of factor prices, regulation reduces output and 
accentuates reductions in employment. 
  A complete analysis of the impact of regulation would require accounting for both 
product market and factor market adjustments. The presumption is that a full account 
would produce disemployment effect of regulation on the overall economy but not 
necessarily in each sector. 
  Notice, however, that even if wages adjust fully and there are no adverse effects of 
regulation on labor demand, regulation may still have substantial effects on the welfare of 
workers. If a job security mandate is offset by lower wages, worker welfare is not 
necessarily improved, at least not for all workers. It may be higher or lower depending on 
how much the mandate differs from what workers and firms would mutually agree upon in 
an unregulated environment. 
(e) Accounting for serial correlation  
While most of the studies summarized in this volume measure the cost of 
regulations by elaborating direct monetary measures of their cost to employers, several 
authors use the length of the lag (the speed of adjustment) as an alternative measure of the 74 
cost of regulation facing the firm. The intuition supporting this is based on the original 
work of Holt, Modisliani, Muth, and Simon (1960), as previously described in section 4.2. 
In the simple model of equations (2) and (3), if we introduce an error term, and an 
implicit theory of optimal employment as a function of the real wage Wt, we obtain 
(4)        t t t bW a n ε + + =
* ,  b ≤ 0.                                                 
If εt is serially correlated, we obtain 
(5)      1 tt t u ε ρε − =+                                                          
where ut has zero mean and is independently and identically distributed and ρ  is the first 
order serial correlation. Analysts obtain a high estimated value of λ (the coefficient on 
lagged labor) from a least squares estimation that does not correct for serial correlation 
since 
(6)      1       .                                                             (1 )( ) (1 )           tt t t na b W n λλ λ ε − =− + + +−       
If 1<λ<1, ρ>0, OLS estimates of λ are upward biased. An asymptotically unbiased 
estimator that accounts for this serial correlation is based on 
(7)   11 2              (1 )(1 ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 )     tt t t t t na b W W n n u λ ρ λ ρ λ ρ λρ λ −− − =− − +− − + + − +−  
which is derived from (6) by lagging it one period, solving for (1-λ)εt-1, writing 
εt=ρεt-1+ut in (6) and substituting for εt-1. This bias is especially important in making cross 
country comparisons where serial correlation coefficients may differ greatly across 
economies. For studies of regulations in a single country, this bias will not affect estimates 
of the relative cost of different reforms if the serial correlation pattern is invariant across 
reforms. However, no meaning can be attached to the absolute value of the lag coefficient. 
  This conventional model assumes symmetric hiring and firing costs. Yet even in 
the original Holt et al study, this assumption was only introduced as a mathematically 
simplifying one that was contrary to their evidence. A more accurate description of the 75 
data from Latin America and other regions is that there are substantial asymmetric 
adjustment costs. 
  A measurement model accounting for asymmetric adjustment costs requires a new 
econometric approach. In work available on request, we consider a model of asymmetric 
hiring and firing costs based on Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). The coefficient on 
lagged labor is not necessarily monotonic in the cost of labor regulations. This may 
account for the ambiguous evidence on the impact of regulation on the cost of adjustment 




  Although there is clearly room for improvement, the body of evidence summarized 
in this chapter, and reported in this book, demonstrates that regulation matters, that the 
choice of labor market institutions matters and that further labor reforms offer the promise 
of promoting both efficiency and equity across demographic groups in Latin America. 
They demonstrate the power of microdata to answer important questions when the 
evidence from cross-country macro-time series is ambiguous. 
                                                           
34 The intuition behind this result is simple. Different serial correlation-fixed cost pairs produce the same 
lagged employment coefficient. This is also possible in the simple model (6). So it is possible that a regime 
with higher labor transition costs is also one with lower serial correlation in shocks and so would display a 
lower estimated lag and a faster adjustment rate. See Barbarino and Heckman (2003). 76 
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Appendix A: Definitions and sources of variables used in section 5 
 
For the empirical analysis described in section 5, we build an unbalanced panel data 
covering the period 1983-1999. Table A.3 describes the variables and their sources.  
Table A.4 describes the countries and the years covered in our sample.  
Computation of Labor Market Regulation Measures  
(1) Advance Notice and Indemnities for dismissal: 
OECD Countries 
We gather information on advance notice and indemnities for dismissal for OECD 
countries from the OECD Employment Outlook (1999), Table 2.A.2: Required notice and 
severance pay for individual dismissal, pp. 94-96, which summarizes the ￿case of a 
regular employee with tenure beyond any trial period, dismissed on personal grounds or 
economic redundancy but without fault￿.  For countries for which is likely that individual 
dismissals be considered ￿unjust￿ (measured as those countries to which the OECD gives 
a score of 2 or more in a 1-3 scale in Table 2.A.4 pp.100), that, is countries where a 
￿transfer and or retraining to adapt to different work must be attempted prior to 
dismissal￿ and where ￿worker capability cannot be ground for dismissal￿, we consider 
the information summarized in the ￿Compensation and related remedies following 
unjustified dismissal￿. From this table, and for this subset of countries, in at least one 
country, unjust dismissals carry a much higher penalty. This is the case of Spain. We 
make this contingency explicit by computing the expected severance pay assigning a ‰ 
probability that a dismissal will be considered unfair and will carry the higher severance 
pay that the law mandates in this event.  We obtain information on labor reforms from 
Table 2.1 pp. 53 (Employment Outlook, 1999), which describes the main changes in 
legislation since the mid eighties. We also compare the information described in OECD 
(1999) with the one presented in Grubb and Wells (1993). If they diverge, we take the 
information in the latter to be valid up to 1993 while we take the information presented in 
OECD (1999) to be valid from 1997 onwards. For the years in between the index has a 
missing value. There are only four countries where there are some divergences between 
the former and the latter source. This is the case of Denmark, Greece, Netherlands and 
Sweden. Finally, in countries where the law prescribes different severance pay and 
advance notice for blue and white-collar workers we compute the cost of dismissal as the 
unweighted average for the two groups. For Hungary, Korea, New Zealand and Turkey 
the job security measures only take non-missing values from 1990 onwards since we 
could not find legal information for former years. To construct our index, we do not 
consider upper monetary limits. In addition, we do not consider benefits that firms pay or 
unions can obtain for their workers, which exceed the legal mandatory. Finally, we do not 
consider what workers can get in courts if they sue their employers. 
Individual country notes: In Australia, we consider the severance pay awarded to 
workers dismissed for redundancy.  For Canada, we take the maximum of the severance 
pay and advance notice mandated by the federal and the local jurisdiction. In Greece, for 
white-collar workers, advance notice can be waived if full severance pay is given. We 
thereby assume that firms pay in full to avoid paying additional advance notice. In 
Ireland, the awarded severance pay depends on the age of the worker. We assume that 
workers receive 0.18 monthly wages per year worked, which corresponds to the 
(unweighted) average of half a week per year worked (workers under the age of 41) and a 
week per year worked (workers over the age of 41). In Norway, after 10 years of tenure, 86 
notice period increases with age. To capture this effect, we have increased notice period 
from 3 months to 4 and 5 in the case of individuals of more than 15 years of tenure. For 
Spain, we adjust the severance pay obtained in case of just dismissal by the fact that 
many dismissals are considered unjust. We therefore weigh mandatory dismissals in case 
of just and unjust causes by a probability of ‰ for each event.  
 Latin America 
We consider the legal information summarized in Tables A.1 and A.2 obtained from the 
Ministries of Labor of individual countries.   
Notes:  In Brazil, employers are required to deposit 8 percent of a workers￿ wage 
in individual workers￿ accounts, which accrue interest rates. In case of a firm initiated 
dismissal, firms are required to pay a worker severance pay that is a given fraction of 
what a worker owns in his individual account. The 1988 constitutional reform increased 
this share from .1 to .4 of the total amount in the fund. To compute the fraction of what is 
accrued in the individual fund, we assume that the interest rate equals the discount rate. 











where i denotes tenure at the firm, δ is the per period probability of survival (equal to 
0.88) and T denotes the maximum tenure of a worker in a firm, which is assumed to be 
equal to twenty. In Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua and Dominican Republic, a constant 
advance notice equal to one month is assumed. In Peru, there were reforms in job security 
in 1991, 1995 and 1996. Tables A.1 and A. 2 only report the schedule as in 1990 and in 
1999. See Saavedra and Torero (this volume) for a more detailed description of the 
changes in the Peruvian labor code throughout the nineties.  
 
(2) Seniority Pay: 
Seniority payments only exist in Latin America. There are two kinds. In Brazil, 
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, workers deposit 1/12 of their monthly wages in individual 









where T = 20. This reflects the discounted value of a stream of payments equivalent to 
one month of pay per year. For Colombia, Kugler (this volume) reports that before the 
1990 labor reform, workers were entitled to one month of salary per year of work as a 
seniority fund upon separation independently of the cause of separation. However, partial 
withdrawals were allowed and deducted in nominal terms from the final payment, 
implying a ￿double retroactivity￿ with an estimated cost of 35 percent of the total 
payments of seniority pay in the manufacturing sector. We therefore apply a surcharge of 
35 percent to the legislated scheduled for seniority pay during the period before 1990.  
Instead, in Venezuela and Panama, labor codes mandate a mandatory seniority 
payment that is computed as multiples of the last wage per year of work.  In those cases, 
seniority pay is computed as: 87 





α δδ = − − ∑
=
, 
where αj denotes multiples of the last wage and i denotes tenure at the firm. In 
Venezuela, the legal codes specified a seniority pay of one monthly wage per year of 
work (αj =1). After the 1997, seniority pay was increased to two monthly wages per year 
of work (αj  =2). Notice that this formula assumes that the probability of worker turnover 
is identical to the probability of job turnover. Since in general, worker turnover rates tend 
to be higher than job turnover rates, we also experimented with a probability of worker 
turnover equal to two times and three times the probability of job turnover. The cost of 
seniority pay declines with the rate of turnover (since the probability of surviving in the 
firm and obtaining larger amounts declines). Our estimated results are robust to different 
assumptions in the worker turnover rate.    
 
(3) Social Security Regulations: 
Information provided by Social Security Programs Throughout the World (biannually 
1983- 1999, US Social Security Administration. Office of Research, Evaluation and 
Statistics). Social security contributions include contributions by employers and 
employees to old age, disability and death; sickness and maternity; work injury; 
unemployment insurance and Family allowances programs. Since this information is only 
available biannually, we extend the data to yearly frequency in two alternative ways: by 
interpolating or by inputting each missing data values with the value in the former year.  
The results of our empirical analysis do not vary with the method used. The results also 
do not vary when we consider only the original biannual data. 
For Argentina, we obtained direct information from the country. Rates apply to 
Buenos Aires.  In all countries, we consider the rates applied to wage earners. We do not 
include contributions made by government to fund social security programs. In cases 
where contributions differ across individuals, states, or industry risk, only one rate is 
chosen, and the choice varies somewhat across countries. However, the same criterion is 
used within countries across time. This somewhat reduces cross-country comparability 
but preserves across time comparability within countries.   
 
(4) Social Security Reform: 
The variable Reform takes a value of 1 after a country has implemented a social security 
reform that totally or partially replaces a pay as you go system by an individually 
capitalization system. Based on social security reforms information summarized in Lora 
and Pages (2000) this variable takes the value of 1 in Chile on and after 1981; in 
Colombia on and after 1994; in Argentina on and after 1994; in Uruguay on and after 
1996; in Mexico and Bolivia on and after 1997; in El Salvador on and after 1998. 88 
Table A.1: Legislation Concerning Termination of Indefinite Contracts in 1987 and 1999.  
x=Monthly Wages, N=Years of Tenure, r =Interest Rate of Fund 
Compensation if worker quits?    Date of 
Reform 
Advance notice  Seniority premium 
  
   1987 1999  1987  1999 1987  1999 
Argentina  None  1-2 months  No changes 0  0  0  0 
Bahamas  None 1/2-1  month  No  changes 0  0  0  0 
Barbados  None Negotiable, 
 in practice 
1month 
No changes 0  0  0  0 




Bolivia  None 3  months  No  changes 0  0  1 x*N.  No changes 
           if N>=5   








Chile  1991 1  month  No  changes 0  0  No  1/2 x*N  (*) 
             if N>=7 




(8% wage+ r) 
              
              
Costa Rica  None 1  month  No  changes 0  0  0  0 
Dominican 
Republic 
1992  1/4 -1 month  No changes 0  0  0  0 






(8% wage+ r) 
No changes 
              
              
El 
Salvador 
1994 0-7  days  No  changes 0  0  0  0 
              
Guatemala  None 0  No  changes 0 0 0  0 
           
            
(*) workers can choose between getting an unconditional payment after 7 years in the firm, or getting a higher indemnity in 
case of dismissal. Most workers opt for the latter. 
FUND: A certain fraction of a worker￿s wage is deposited in an individual account every month. The principal plus the interest 
can be withdrawn by the worker upon dismissal and in some cases, upon voluntary separation.89 
Table A.1: Legislation Concerning Termination of Indefinite Contracts in 1987 and 1999.  
x=Monthly Wages, N=Years of Tenure, r =Interest Rate of Fund . (Continuation) 
  Date of 
reform 
Advance notice  Seniority premium  Compensation if worker quits?
    1987 1999 1987 1999 1987  1999
Guyana  1997  1/2 month  1 month 
if N>=1 
0 0  0  0 
Honduras  None 1day-2  months  No  changes 0  0  0  0 
Jamaica  None 
 
2-12 weeks  No changes 0  0  0  0 
              
Mexico  None  0 - 1 month  No changes 0  0  0  0 
Nicaragua  1996  1- 2 months  0  0  0  0  x*N if N=1-3 
3x*N + 
+ 2/3x*N if N>3
Panama  1995  1 Month  No changes 1/4x*N 1/4x  *N  1/4x*N  …*x*N 
       if N>=10    if N>=10   
              






0 No  changes FUND 
(8% wage+r)
No changes FUND 
(8% wage+r) 
No changes 




None 2  months    0  0  0  0 
Uruguay  None 0  No  changes x*N  No changes 0  0 
Venezuela  1997  1/4 ￿3 months No changes x*N 2x*N  x*N  2x*N 
FUND: A certain fraction of a worker￿s wage is deposit in an individual account every month. The principal plus the interest can 
be withdrawn by the worker upon dismissal and in some cases, upon voluntary separation. 
Source: Ministries of Labor in Latin America and the Caribbean90 
Table A.2: Legislation Concerning Indemnities for Dismissal in 1987 and 1999.  
x=Monthly Wages, N=Years of Tenure,    r =Interest Rate of Fund 
 Date of 
reform 
Compensation for dismissal due to 
economic reasons 
To whom do the 
reforms apply? 
Upper limit to 
compensation for 
dismissal? 
   1987 1999  1987  1999 
Argentina  None  2/3x*N, Min 2 months  No changes    Max. lim. in  x No changes 
Bahamas  None  Negotiable  No changes    No  No changes 
Barbados  None  0.41x*N 
if N>=2 
 
No changes    3.75 monthly 
salaries 
 
Belize  None  1/4x*N 
If N>5 
No changes    Max 42 weeks No changes 
Bolivia  None  1 x*N.  No changes    No  No changes 
           
Brazil  1988  0.1*FUND 0.4*FUND  All Workers  No  No changes 




           
Colombia  1990  45 days+ 




All workers  No  No changes 
   x*N*0.66   if           N≥5 & 
N<10     
x*N*0.66   if   
 N≥5 & N<10  
    
   x*N  if N≥10  x*N*1.33  if 
N≥10 
    
Costa Rica  None  x*N  No changes    8  monthly sal. No changes 
Dominican 
Republic 




New employees  No  No changes 
Ecuador  1991  2  if N <=2 
4  if N = 2 - 5 
3  if N <=3 
x* N  if N>3




    6  if N = 5 ￿ 20 
12 if N>20 
      
El Salvador  1994  x*N x*N  All workers  Max. base 
wage= 
No changes 
   0  if  bankruptcy  Changes 
in max. x 
  4 min. wages  
Guatemala  None  2 days-4months if 
bankruptcy. X*N 
otherwise 
No changes    No  No changes 
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Table A.2: Legislation Concerning Indemnities for Dismissal in case of Termination of Indefinite Contracts in 
1987 and 1999.  
x=Monthly Wages, N=Years of Tenure,   r =Interest Rate of Fund  (Continuation) 
 Date of 
reform 
Compensation dismissal due to economic 
reasons 
To whom do the 
reforms apply? 
Upper limit to compensation 
for dismissal? 
   1987  1999    1987  1999 
Guyana  1997 Negotiable In practice,
2 1/2 weeks per N 
1/4x*N 










Honduras  None  x*N No changes   15 monthly 
wages
No changes
Jamaica  None 
 
1/3x*N if x=2-5
1/2X*N if x>5 
No changes   No No changes
    
Mexico  None  2/3 x*N
 (Min. 3*x)
No changes   No No changes
Nicaragua  1996 Negotiated
In practice, 2 x*N 
 x*N if N=1-3
3x*N + 2/3x*N if N>3
  No  5 monthly 
salaries 
Panama  1995  x*N if N<=1
3x if N=2
3/4x*N if N<10 New employees  No No changes
    3x + 3/4x*N if 
N>2<10
7.5x+1/4x*N  if 
N>=10
 
    9x+ 1/4x*N if N>=10  
Paraguay  None  1/2 x*N  1/2 x*N    No No changes
Peru  All workers  12 monthly 
salaries
No changes




 3 x*N       1.5*x*N 
 
Suriname  None Negotiated Negotiated   No No  changes
Trinidad  None  1/3 x*N if N = 1- 4, 
1/2 x*N if N>5 
No changes   No No changes
Uruguay  None  x*N No changes    6 monthly 
salaries
No changes
Venezuela  1997  2/3-2 x*N x*N All workers  No 5 monthly 
salaries
FUND: A certain fraction of a workers￿ wage is deposit in an individual account every month. The principal plus the interest can be 
withdrawn by the worker upon dismissal and in some cases, upon voluntary separation. 
Source: Ministries of labor in Latin America and the Caribbean.   92
Table A.3 Definitions and sources of variables used in Section 5 
Variable   Source  Description 
Employment/Population  OECD Statistics and 
Household Surveys 
Data from Latin 
America 
OECD: Employment to population Rate of people 15-64. National and/or European 
Labour Force Surveys are the main source for the ￿Labour Force Statistics￿ database. 
LATIN AMERICA: Computed directly from Household Survey Data for the countries, 
years and sources listed in Table A.4. Employment to population rate for workers 15-65. 
Are considered employed all workers that declared having a job in the week of reference. 
It also includes unpaid workers.  National data except in Argentina, Bolivia and Uruguay.  
 
Unemployment  OECD Statistics and 
Household Surveys 
Data from Latin 
America 
OECD: Unemployment rate of people 15-64. National and/or European Labour Force 
Surveys are the main source for the ￿Labor Market Statistics indicator￿ (LMSI) database, 
OECD.  
LATIN AMERICA:  % of the labor force 15-65 that did not work in the period of 
reference but are actively looking for a job.  National data except in Argentina, Bolivia and 
Uruguay. 
 
GDP growth  World Bank 
Development Indicators 
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. 
Aggregates are based on constant 1995 U.S. dollars. GDP measures the total output of 
goods and services for final use occurring within the domestic territory of a given country, 
regardless of the allocation to domestic and foreign claims.  
 
GDP per capita, PPP 
(current international $) 
World Bank 
Development Indicators 
GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). GDP PPP is gross domestic 
product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An 
international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar in the 
United States. GDP measures the total output of goods and services for final use occurring 
within the domestic territory of a given country, regardless of the allocation to domestic 
and foreign claims.  
Share of WAP 25-54  UN Population 
Statistics 1998 
Share of population 15 to 64 that are between 25 to 54 years old   
Share of WAP 55-64  UN Population 
Statistics 1998 
Share of population 15 to 64 that are 55 or older 
Advance Notice  (AN)  Own Construction  Expected discounted cost of providing mandatory advance notice measured in multiples of 
monthly wages 
Indemnities for Dismissal 
(ID) 
Own Construction  Expected discounted cost of providing mandatory indemnities for dismissal measured in 
multiples of monthly wages 








US Social Security 
Administration 
Per period cost of Social Security Contributions measures as a % of monthly wages 
WAP denotes Working Age Population   93
Table A. 4 Countries and years included in baseline specification  
(Table 8.A col. 1; N=417) 
Country  Years included in baseline specification  N  Source of Employment and Unemployment Data 
Argentina 1996,  1998,  1999  3  Encuesta Permanente de Hogares 
Australia 1983-1999  17 LMSI,  OECD 
Austria 1983-1999  17 LMSI,  OECD 
Belgium 1983-1988  16 LMSI,  OECD 
Bolivia  1986, 1990, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999  7  Encuesta Continua de Hogares/ Condiciones de 
Vida 
Brazil  1983, 1986, 1988, 1992, 1993, 1995-1999  10 Pesquisa Nacional de Amostra de Domicilios 
Canada 1983-1999  17 LMSI,  OECD 
Chile  1987, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998  6  Encuesta de Caracterizaci￿n Socioec￿mica Nacional 
Colombia  1990, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1996-1999  8  Encuesta Nacional de Hogares 
Costa Rica  1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 
1997, 1998 
9  Encuesta Nacional de Hogares 
Dominican 
Rep. 
1996, 1998  2  Encuesta Nacional de Fuerza de Trabajo 
El Salvador  1995, 1997, 1998  3  Encuesta de Hogares de prop￿sitos mœltiples 
Finland 1983-1999  17 LMSI,  OECD 
France 1983-1999  17 LMSI,  OECD 
Germany 1992-1999  8  LMSI,  OECD 
Greece 1983-1993  11 LMSI,  OECD 
Honduras  1989, 1992, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999  6  Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Prop￿sitos 
Multiples 
Ireland 1983-1999  17 LMSI,  OECD 
Italy 1983-1999  17 LMSI,  OECD 
Japan 1983-1999  17 LMSI,  OECD 
Korea 1991-1999  9  LMSI,  OECD 
MØxico  1984, 1989, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998  6  Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso Gasto de los Hogares 
Netherlands 1983-1992,  1997  11 LMSI,  OECD 
New Zealand  1991-1999  9  LMSI, OECD 
Nicaragua 1993,1998  2  Encuesta  Nacional de Hogares sobre Medici￿n de 
Niveles de Vida 
Norway 1983-1999  17 LMSI,  OECD 
Panama  1991, 1995, 1997,1998,1999   5  Encuesta continua de Hogares 
Paraguay 1995,  1998  2  Encuesta de Hogares 
Peru  1985, 1991, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1998  6  Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medici￿n de 
Niveles de Vida.  
Poland 1991-1998  8  LMSI,  OECD 
Portugal 1983-1999  17 LMSI,  OECD 
Spain 1983-1999  17 LMSI,  OECD 
Sweden 1983-1999  17 LMSI,  OECD 
Switzerland 1983-1999  17 LMSI,  OECD 
Turkey 1991-1999  9  LMSI,  OECD 
United 
Kingdom 
1987-1999 13 LMSI,  OECD 
United States  1983-1999  17 LMSI, OECD 
Uruguay  1989, 1992, 1995, 1997, 1998  5  Encuesta Continua de Hogares 
Venezuela  1983,1986, 1989, 1993, 1995, 1997-1999  8  Encuesta de Hogares por Muestra 
Note: LMSI stands for Labour Market Statistics Indicators Appendix B1
Dynamic Demand Speci￿cations
All of the papers on labor demand in this volume ignore the asymmetric nature of labor adjust-
ment costs. In this appendix, we explore the consequences of this asymmetry on labor demand. The
main conclusion is that static and dynamic costs of labor have separate eﬀects on labor demand,
and in general no scalar index adequately summarizes these costs. In order to specify labor demand
functions in the presence of asymmetric hiring and ￿ring costs, it is convenient to use a two period
model. Such a model is implicit in Kugler (this volume). Let f( ) denote output as a function of
labor input  .L e tθ be a second period productivity shock. It is normalized against a ￿rst period
productivity shock of ￿1.￿ We assume, for simplicity, that workers do not quit once they are hired.
Labor hired in period 1 is  1.L a b o re m p l o y e di np e r i o d2 is  2 =  1+∆. ∆ is thus the change in
the stock of period 1 labor. Spot wage W is assumed to be common in both periods, and is assumed
to be exogenous to the ￿rm. The cost of ￿r i n gaw o r k e ri sC.O ﬀsetting this cost is the saving
in wages. The cost of hiring a worker is the wage. Asymmetry arises when C 6=0 . Assume no
discounting. Labor  1 is kept on in period 2 unless second period demand shocks (θ) are suﬃciently
low. The ￿rm maximizes pro￿ts:
f( 1) − W  1 + E[θf( 1 + ∆) − W( 1 + ∆) − CMax(−∆,0)] (B-1)
where the ￿rst period labor productivity is normalized to 1.
We assume that the support of θ is (0,∞) and that θ is an (absolutely continuous) random
variable. If θ ≥ 1 with probability 1, the ￿rm in the second period wants ∆ ≥ 0. Labor productivity
has increased when θ is bigger than its ￿rst period value, which implicitly is set at 1.
The presence of second period ￿ring costs inhibits hiring in the ￿rst period. Thus, anticipating
1We thank Jagadeesh Sivadasan for helpful comments on this draft.the possibility of an adverse shock in the second period, the ￿rm hires less labor than it would hire
in the ￿rst period in the absence of ￿ring costs. If, for the sake of making an heuristic argument,
we characterize the ￿rm as myopically maximizing period-by-period pro￿ts, the ￿rm acts as if the
￿rst period productivity shock is less than 1 in making its ￿rst period decisions and hires less labor
than it would if there were no second period ￿ring costs. Letting ﬂ θ be the value of the ￿as if￿ ￿rst






If θ = ﬂ θ,t h e￿rm stays put at  1 so that  1 =  2 and ∆ =0 . If productivity is below ﬂ θ,t h e
￿rm may still keep its workforce at  1 =  2 because it is costly to ￿re labor. We now determine the
lower bound on θ that gives rise to inaction. For a ￿xed  1, the two required conditions for inaction
(∆ =0 )are θf0( 1) <W, so it pays in gross terms to get rid of a unit of  1,a n dθf0( 1) >W− C,
so it does not pay in net terms. Thus the inequalities determining the zone of inaction are (for a
given  1)
W − C ≤ θf
0( 1) ≤ W.





∗. Holding  1 ￿xed, raising C lowers the threshold θ
∗.T h u s
the zone of inaction for a given ( 1,C) is θ
∗ ≤ θ ≤ ﬂ θ,w h e r eﬂ θ = W/(f0( 1)).
The ￿rst order condition for  1 is f0( 1)−W+E(θf0( 1+∆)−W)=0 , where ∆ =0if θ
∗ ≤ θ ≤ ﬂ θ,
∆ < 0 if θ<θ
∗ and ∆ > 0 if θ>ﬂ θ.F r o mc o n c a v i t y , 1 is decreasing in cost C.I n t u i t i v e l y ,￿rms
with high ￿ring costs hold back on hiring  1. There is an option value of holding back on hiring  1
to avoid the cost of ￿ring unwanted second period labor. In order to characterize  1, we must ￿rst
characterize ∆( 1).
Second Period (Conditional on  1) Demand Functions
Letting ∆− denote the reduction in the stock of labor, we obtain the ￿rst order condition for
∆− as
θf
0( 1 + ∆
−)=W − C
2or









Take  1 as given. Observe that if 0 <θ<θ
∗, ∆ < 0.D e ￿ne ϕ ≡ f0−1. Observe that from concavity
ϕ0 < 0.T h e n







Observe that at θ = θ







the ￿rm operates at  1 and ∆ =0 .I fθ<θ






De￿ne g(θ) as the density of θ.G i v e n 1, expected demand in period 2 (averaged over the θ states)
is, for a given ￿rm,



























































































































































































3The positivity of this ￿nal expression arises from the fact that as C increases, the ￿rm is more risk
averse (θ
∗ falls) so that it is more likely that it hires labor in the second period.
If θ is iid across ￿rms in period 2, and iid across time, then the mean conditional (on  1)l a b o r
demand function is not a direct function of W +Pr(0 <θ<θ
∗)C which, in this simple framework,
is the measure of labor cost used in Heckman and PagØs (2000) and in the empirical analysis of
Section 5. In fact, the model predicts that
∂E( 2 | W,C, 1)
∂W
+




∂E( 2 | W,C, 1)
∂W
is larger in absolute value than
∂E( 2 | W,C, 1)
∂C
although they are of
opposite signs.
This analysis suggests that empirical speci￿cations of labor demand functions should use C and
W separately. W corresponds to static costs as de￿ned in the text. C corresponds to costs of
adjustment. OLS regressions of conditional (on  1) demand functions do not identify the standard
substitution terms used in static demand analysis.
One way to avoid problems with direct estimation of labor demand functions is to estimate
production functions. These can be used to derive the demand functions given ￿xed costs without
directly estimating demand functions with ￿xed costs.
First Period Demand Functions
These are obtained by substituting each state-contingent  2 =  1 + ∆ demand function into
(B-1) and maximizing with respect to  1. As in the analysis of the second period demand function,
W +P r ( 0<θ<θ
∗) C is not an appropriate marginal price in any state. Substituting into (B-1),
and making the dependence of ∆− and ∆+ on W,C, 1 explicit, we obtain total pro￿ts (as perceived
in the ￿rst period) as




θf( 1 + ∆
−(W,C, 1,θ)) − (W − C)∆











θf( 1 + ∆




Assuming an interior solution, and using the envelope theorem,
f




0( 1 + ∆




0( 1) − W]g(θ)dθ =0
so the ￿rst period demand obtained as the solution to this equation   is a function of W and C
separately and not W + Pr(0 <θ≤ θ
∗)C. O b s e r v e ,t r i v i a l l y ,t h a tt h e 1 obtained as a solution of
this ￿rst order condition is lower than the  1 obtained when C =0 . This rationalizes our choice of
ﬂ θ<1 in the heuristic solution outlined above.
5  94
Table 1 Latin American & Caribbean Economic Performance Indicators 
















Growth    
1980-2001 
Employment 
Growth     1980-
1999 
Female Labor Force 
Participation 
Growth     1980-
1999 
Average Urban 
Unemp. Rate   
1980-2000 
   (1)   (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)    (6)   
Argentina   11320    0.849  1.132 1.16    1.12    9.30   
Brazil   7360    0.777  2.488 2.72    2.11    5.62   
Chile   9190    0.831  4.814 2.63    2.17    10.09   
Colombia   7040    0.779  3.089 3.23    3.56    12.10   
Peru   4570    0.775  1.553 3.52    2.27    8.03   
Uruguay   8400    0.834  1.795 1.43    2.37    10.62   
Barbados   15560    0.888  1.173 1.28    1.30    15.77   
Jamaica   3720    0.757  1.557 1.60    0.89    19.40   
Trinidad and Tobago    9100    0.802  0.108 0.78    1.30    15.85   
Average     8473.33     0.810    1.970    2.04    1.90         
Notes: (3) measured in local currency at constant prices; (6) Caribbean rates are not comparable to LA rates because they are 
computed with a different methodology;  
Sources: (1), (3) and (5) World Development Indicators (World Bank CD-ROM, 2000), The World Bank; (2) United Nations;  (4)  
and  (6) ECLAC and ILO.  95
 
Table 2: Compliance with Regulations      
  
% of workers affiliated with 
mandatory Social Security programs
 % of workers 25-40 






% of Total 
Employment 
% of Wage 
Employment 
 Non  Compliance 
with Minimum 
wages 
   Mean 1990s  Mean 1990s  End 1990s 
Average Latin America (*)  39.35  60.05  10.06 
Argentina 48.45  66.56  3.11 
Bolivia (1999)  26.36  38.56  1.11 
Brazil 48.18  64.04  5.80 
Chile 64.47  77.45  7.3 
Colombia (1999)  46.13  66.77  26.9 
Costa Rica   65.92  74.61  15.7 
Dominican Republic (1998)  29.08  49.40  NA 
Ecuador (1995)  30.94  43.02  NA 
El Salvador (1998)  33.49  50.04  3.6 
Mexico 52.53  67.96  0.5 
Panama (2001)  55.66  74.50  14.8 
Paraguay (1995)  16.70  30.66  NA 
Peru 17.99  51.90  23.5 
Uruguay 74.12  93.12  0.5 
Venezuela (1998)  31.37  52.22    17.9 
Notes: (*) Unweighted Average. Percentage of workers between 15 and 64 that are affiliated to social security. 
Time series data for the nineties is incomplete, the mean and trend were computed when data included 3 or more 
years, spread over 3 periods: early (1990-93), mid (1994-97) and late (1998-01).  Non Compliance with Minimum 
Wage refers to employees between 25 and 40 years old working more than 30 hours. Figures for this variable date 
from the late nineties. Source: IADB (2003) based on individual country household surveys 
   96
Table 3: Measures of Labor Market Regulations. End of the 1990￿s    





















   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)+(2)+(3)+(4)     
Australia 1999  0.73  0.99  0.00  1.95  3.67  53.04%  0.02 
Austria 1999  0.85  0.94  0.00  58.29  60.07  97.03%  0.45 
Belgium 1999  1.73  0.00  0.00  40.17  41.89  95.87%  0.31 
Canada 1999  0.60  0.19  0.00  18.56  19.35  95.93%  0.14 
Denmark 1999  1.73  0.04  0.00  NA  1.77     
Finland 1999  1.61  0.00  0.00  35.62  37.23  95.67%  0.27 
France 1999  0.98  0.36  0.00  64.77  66.11  97.97%  0.50 
Germany 1999  1.14  0.00  0.00  53.48  54.63  97.91%  0.41 
Greece 1999  0.00  1.34  0.00  46.54 47.88  97.20% 0.36 
Hungary 1999  0.87  0.73  0.00  65.56  67.15  97.63%  0.51 
Ireland 1999  0.45  0.58  0.00  24.67  25.70  95.99%  0.19 
Italy 1999  0.60  2.63  0.00  91.53  94.76  96.60%  0.71 
Japan 1999  0.59  0.00  0.00  36.36  36.95  98.40%  0.28 
Korea 1999  0.59  2.99  0.00  18.08  21.66  83.49%  0.14 
Netherlands 1999  0.88  0.00  0.00  84.99 85.87  98.97%  0.65 
New Zealand  1999  0.22  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.22  0.00%  0.00 
Norway 1999  0.88  0.00  0.00  28.43  29.31  97.00%  0.22 
Poland 1999  1.22  0.00  0.00  60.48  61.70  98.02%  0.47 
Portugal 1999  1.18  3.30  0.00  49.01  53.49  91.63%  0.38 
Spain 1999  0.59  2.58  0.00  49.43  52.60  93.98%  0.38 
Sweden 1999  1.79  0.00  0.00  28.86  30.65  94.16%  0.22 
Switzerland 1999  1.25  0.00  0.00  19.26 20.51  93.92%  0.15 
Turkey 1999  0.99  2.99  0.00  44.79  48.76  91.85%  0.35 
United Kingdom  1999  0.71  0.72  0.00  28.82  30.25  95.27%  0.22 
United States  1999  0.00  0.00  0.00  23.56  23.56  100.00%  0.18 
Average OECD  1999  0.89  0.82  0.00  40.55  42.25  95.97%  0.31 
Argentina 1999  0.80  2.20  0.00  44.49  47.48  93.69%  0.34 
Bolivia 1999  1.77  2.99  0.00  31.16  35.91  86.76%  0.24 
Brazil 1999  0.59  2.45  9.82  37.65  50.51  74.53%  0.29 
Chile 1999  0.59  2.79  0.00  27.20  30.58  88.95%  0.21 
Colombia 1999  0.30  3.49  9.82  38.75  52.35  74.01%  0.30 
Costa Rica  1999  1.05  2.60  0.00  35.05  38.69  90.58%  0.27 
Dominican Rep.  1999  0.59  2.16  0.00  16.23  18.97  85.52%  0.13 
Ecuador 1999  0.59  3.30  9.82  22.85  36.56  62.50%  0.18 
El Salvador  1999  0.06  2.99  0.00  27.26  30.31  89.94%  0.21 
Honduras 1999  0.59  2.94  0.00  13.63  17.16  79.43%  0.11 
Jamaica 1999  0.59  1.41  0.00  6.49  8.49  76.47%  0.05 
Mexico 1999  0.59  2.57  0.00  29.50  32.66  90.33%  0.23 
Nicaragua 1999  0.59  1.97  0.00  19.47  22.04  88.37%  0.15 
Panama 1999  0.59  2.09  0.75  15.19  18.62  81.58%  0.12 
Paraguay 1999  0.68  1.49  0.00  27.26  29.43  92.63%  0.21 
Peru 1999  0.00  3.80  9.82  27.26  40.88  66.69%  0.21 
Trinidad & Tobago  1999  1.18  1.33  0.00  10.90  13.41  81.31%  0.08 
Uruguay 1999  0.00  2.23  0.00  52.58  54.81  95.93%  0.41 
Venezuela 1999  0.93  2.03  5.97  18.43  27.36  67.37%  0.14 
Avg. Latin America    0.63  2.46  2.42  26.39  31.91  82.45%  0.20 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on OECD (1999), Grubbs and Wells (1993), US Social Security Administration and Ministries of 
Labor in Latin America and the Caribbean. EPV denotes Expected Present Discounted Value   97
Table 4: Estimates of long-run constant-output labor demand elasticity   
Study   Data  Description  Wage  Elasticity 
A. Latin America 
Mondino & Montoya (this 
volume)  




No capital. Instruments 
for output and wages. 
From dynamic labor 
demand 
[-.353,-.94] 
Saavedra & Torero (this volume) Panel of Establishments. 
Firms with more than 10 
workers.1986-1996. 
Bimonthly. Peru 
No capital. Instruments 
for output. Labor costs 
includes legislative 
costs. Static labor 
demand 
-.19 
    
Fajnzylber & Maloney (2000)  Panel of Establishments.  
Yearly. Various countries 
 
   Chile(1981-1986)   
             White Collar  -0.214 
             Blue Collar  -0.373 
   Colombia  (1990-1991)   
             White Collar  -0.26 
             Blue Collar  -0.489 
   Mexico  (1986-1990)   
             White Collar  -0.128 
             Blue Collar  -0.203 
    
Roberts & Skoufias(1997)  Panel of manufacturing data. 
1981-1987. Colombia 
 
             Skilled  -0.42 
             Unskilled  -0.65 
    
Cassoni et al. (this volume)  2-digit manufacturing. 
1975-1997. Uruguay.  
No capital. System of equations 
            1975-1984  -0.69 
            1985-1997  -0.22 
Cardenas and Bernal (this 
volume) 
 
Panel of  92 
Manufacturing Sectors 
4 digit CIIU. 1978-1995
No capital. Dynamic 
labor demand 
-1.43 
B. Rest of the World 
Waud 
(1968)  




de Pelsmacker (1984)  5 auto manufacturing 
firms. 1976-82; Belgium 
Capital, labor prices, 
production workers 
-0.44 
Field & Grebenstein (1980)  10 2-digit manufacturing 
ind. 1971. U.S. 
Capital and energy 
prices included 
-0.51 




Capital & energy 
prices 
 
     Canada  1962-1975  -0.46 
            U.S. 1948-1971   -0.56 
Wylie 
(1990) 
 Four 2-digit manufacturing.  
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Table 6: Summary of existing evidence on the impact of job security (JS) costs  
in Latin America 
Study   Country  Data  Results 
A. Studies that analyze exit rates into and out of employment 
Kugler  
(This volume) 
Colombia  Household data  Decline in JS leads to reduction in employment duration, reduction in 
unemployment duration. Some effect due to de-regulation of temporary 




Peru  Household data  Lower JS leads to lower average tenure.  Higher decline  in formal sector.  
Hazard rates increase just at the end of probation period.  
Paes de Barros and 
Corseuil (This 
volume) 
Brazil  Employment Surveys, Administrative 
data and Household surveys 
Hazard rates for short durations declined but Hazard rates for longer 
durations increased after an increase in job security. No effects either on 
adjustment costs or wage elasticities. 
Hopenhayn (This 
volume) 
Argentina  Household data Rotating Panel  Deregulation of temporary contracts leads to increase in hazard rates. 
Hazard rates for short spells (1-3 months) increase by 40% and for 3-6 
months spells by 10%.  
B. Studies that analyze average employment and unemployment 
Kugler  
(This volume)  
Colombia  Household data on employment.   Decline in JS in 1990 brings a decline in unemployment rates. This is 
based on computing the net effect of changes in hazard rates, in and out of 
unemployment, induced by the reduction in JS. 
Saavedra and Torero 
(This volume) 
Peru  Firm and sector level data. 1986-1997  They include a direct measure of JS regulations in labor demand function. 
They estimate a negative and statistically significant coefficient, which is 





Argentina  Panel of manufacturing firms. It does 
not account for firm creation. 
As Saavedra and Torero (this volume), they include a direct measure of JS 
in labor demand. They also find a negative effect of JS on LD.  
P. de Barros and 
Corseuil (2000)  
Brazil  Monthly establishment-level data. 
1985-1998 Manufacturing. Firms 
employing 5 or more workers 
Two step procedure. First, find parameters for labor demand (LD) function 
for every month. Then see whether those parameters change with labor 
reforms and other development.  They find no effect of  JS on LD 
parameters.  





Aggregated employment. Annual. It 
covers large firms (>10 emp) 
 The effects of JS on employment are statistically insignificant and the 
signs are positive in some cases.  
PagØs and 
Montenegro (1999) 
Chile  Household data on employment. 
Annual 1960-1998 
Not a significant effect of JS on aggregated employment but important 
effect on its composition.  
Marquez (1998)    Cross-
Country 
Cross-section data for Latin America, 
Caribbean and OECD countries.   
Rank indicator of Job Security. JS is not significantly associated with 
lower employment once GDP per capita is accounted for.  
C. Studies that analyze the composition of employment 
Marquez (1998)   Cross-
Country 
Cross-section data for Latin America, 
Caribbean and OECD countries. 
Self-employment rates are positively associated with JS even after 
accounting for differences in GDP per capita.  
Montenegro and 
PagØs (This volume) 
Chile  Household Survey Data. 1960-1998  Job security is associated with lower employment rates for young workers, 
female and unskilled workers and higher employment for older and skilled 
workers 
   108
 
Table 7: Summary Statistics of Sample used in Baseline Regression
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max
A. Total Sample. N = 417 
Employment/Population 54.92 7.16 36.90 76.89
Unemployment Rate
￿ 7.82 4.33 0.50 23.80
Log GDP per capita PPP adj.  9.43 0.63 7.35 10.37
GDP growth  2.92 2.77 -8.59 12.82
Share of working age pop. 25 -54  0.62 0.03 0.51 0.68
Share of working age pop. 55 -64  0.14 0.03 0.06 0.19
Social Security (% wage)  0.27 0.15 0.00 0.71
Advance notice (*)  0.82 0.48 0.00 1.97
Indemnities for Dismissal (*)  1.27 1.40 0.00 5.97
Seniority Pay (*)  0.65 2.35 0.00 9.82
Social Security (*) 









B. Latin America. N = 88 
Employment/Population 59.09 5.35 47.10 76.89
Unemployment Rate  6.52 3.23 0.63 17.10
Log GDP per capita PPP adj.  8.49 0.45 7.35 9.44
GDP growth  3.31 3.60 -8.59 12.82
Share of working age pop. 25 -54  0.58 0.03 0.51 0.64
Share of working age pop. 55 -64  0.09 0.02 0.06 0.16
Social Security (% wage)  0.23 0.08 0.10 0.42
Advance notice (*)  0.65 0.45 0.00 1.77
Indemnities for Dismissal (*)  2.82 1.05 0.00 5.97
Seniority Pay (*)   3.09 4.33 0.00 9.82
Social Security (*) 









C. Industrial Countries Sample. N = 329 
Employment/Population 53.81 7.17 36.90 68.60
Unemployment Rate
￿ 8.17 4.52 0.50 23.80
Log GDP per capita PPP adj.  9.68 0.38 8.50 10.37
GDP growth  2.81 2.50 -7.00 10.74
Share of working age pop. 25 -54  0.62 0.03 0.57 0.68
Share of working age pop. 55 -64  0.15 0.02 0.09 0.19
Social Security (% wage)  0.29 0.16 0.00 0.71
Advance notice (*)  0.87 0.48 0.00 1.97
Indemnities for Dismissal  0.86 1.17 0.00 3.30
Seniority Pay  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Social Security (*) 









(*) Regulatory variables measured in multiples of monthly wages,  (**) measured as % of wages 
￿N = 416; 
￿N = 328  109















 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Advance 13.938  12.400        13.755  16.637 
Notice  (AN)  (15.959)  (16.841)        (14.564)  (15.420) 
          
Indemnities   1.161    -0.469      -2.577  0.330 
Dismissal  (ID)  (0.897)    (0.730)      (1.196)
* (1.637) 
          
Seniority 3.292      1.837    N.A.  1.887 
Pay (SenP)  (1.195)
**    (0.213)
**    (2.197) 
          
Social Sec  -0.230        -0.191  -0.301  -0.187 
Cont. (SSC)  (0.081)




          






* (0.050)  (0.072) 
          
Log GDP per   2.318  -0.320  -0.451  0.834  3.122  1.828  11.639 
Capita (1.277)  (1.044)  (1.079)  (2.253)  (2.260)  (1.334)  (8.152) 
          
Share WAP   17.584  29.171  33.259  22.143  16.534  12.112  9.126 
25-54  (16.750) (16.608) (18.135) (21.704) (23.535) (19.197)  (70.273) 
          
Share WAP  48.456  20.450  27.060  20.614 59.725 50.009  -197.99 
55-64  (35.685) (27.018) (27.465) (26.721) (33.501) (35.553)  (317.709) 
          
Constant 13.588  28.759  37.614  32.086  17.013  8.519  -40.525 
 (17.743)  (18.736)  (13.754)
** (13.318)
* (13.165) (31.305)  (55.759) 
          
Number of 
Observations 
417 476 480 564 484 329  88 
R
2 0.91  0.90  0.89  0.88  0.90  0.93  0.82 
P-Value F test
*** 0.00          0.04  0.00 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specification include country fixed effects. * indicates significant at 5% level; ** significant 
at 1% level; *** P Value of test that all regulation are jointly equal to zero. N.A. = not applicable. WAP denotes Working Age 
Population   110
 















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
Advance   -9.13  -7.29        -9.19  4.06 
Notice (AN)  (11.08)  (11.03)        (10.62)  (9.96) 
          
Indemnities  0.50  -0.01    3.00  0.43 
Dismissal  (ID)  (1.00)  (0.40)     (1.01)
** (1.12) 
          
Seniority  0.79    0.21  N.A.  0.84 
Pay (SenP)  (1.33)      (0.13)      (1.43) 
          
Soc.  Sec.  0.18      0.13  0.22  0.15 
Cont. (SSC)  (0.07)
*      ( 0 . 0 5 )
* (0.09)
* (0.09) 
          









          
GDP  per    -2.28 1.78 1.55 1.87 -1.47  -2.70  4.37 
Capita  (1.26) (1.27) (1.05) (1.28) (1.30) (1.36)  (3.13) 
          
Share  WAP  18.85 -2.72 -5.72 -4.27 17.19 25.20  -66.30 
25-54  (14.26) (16.00) (16.72) (14.98) (16.96) (16.44)  (29.54)
* 
          
Share WAP  -7.35  6.69  2.17  -15.41  -14.69  -7.97  134.98 
55-64  (28.58) (24.90) (25.19) (22.29) (25.26) (31.36)  (214.64) 
          
Constant 23.01  1.13  -3.20  1.05  13.19  28.44  -16.54 
 (13.02)  (12.88)  (9.99)  (7.40)  (7.63)  (23.31)  (34.32) 
Number of 
observations. 
416 475 479 563 483 328  88 
R
2  0.84 0.79 0.78 0.79 0.84 0.86  0.72 
P-Value F 
***  0.02       0.03  0.00 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specification include country fixed effects;* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% 
level; *** P Value of test that all regulation are jointly equal to zero. N.A. = not applicable. WAP denotes Working Age Population   111
Table 9: Do all regulations have an equal effect? : Whole Sample 
  Employment Employment Employment Unemployment Unemployment Unemployment 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
-0.644     0.121      AN+ID 
(0.651)     (0.342)     
            
-0.229     0.169      SenP +SSC 
(0.081)*     (0.066)*     
            
AN+ID+SenP   0.492      0.226   
   (1.102)     (0.925)   
            
 -0.230     0.169    Social Security Cont. (SSC) 
 (0.078)**     (0.066)*   
            
AN+ID+SenP 
 +SSC 
   -0.231     0.169 
     (0.079)**      (0.066)* 
            
GDP Growth  0.089  0.090  0.089  -0.157  -0.157  -0.157 
 (0.045)  (0.045)*  (0.045)  (0.040)** (0.040)** (0.040)** 
            
2.283 2.222 2.246  -2.276  -2.283  -2.281  Log (GDP) 
Per capita 
PPP adj. 
(1.314) (1.319) (1.324)  (1.272)  (1.271)  (1.269) 
            
% of WAP 
  
19.660 20.788 20.662  20.431 20.557 20.548 
25-54 (17.441)  (18.116)  (18.018)  (15.120)  (14.953)  (14.926) 
            
% of WAP  56.924  57.644  58.367  -5.119  -5.007  -4.949 
55-64 (35.411)  (36.408)  (35.863)  (29.241)  (29.024)  (29.031) 
            
Constant 27.194  23.669  25.604 15.621  15.285  15.438 
 (13.367)  (13.226)  (13.741)  (10.285)  (10.434)  (9.910) 
            
Number of Obs..  417  417  417  416  416  416 
R
2 0.91  0.91  0.91  0.84  0.84  0.84 
            
Test AN=ID***  0.42      0.39     


























Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications contain individual countries, fixed-effects * significant at 5% level; ** 
significant at 1% level; *** P-Values of the Tests in this row and below.  WAP denotes Working Age Population 
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Table 10: Estimates of Wage Pass-Through for Different Labor Demand Elasticities. 





















































 is obtained from a regression in which the dependent variable is computed in logarithms and 
all regulatory variables are also computed in logs. The other control variables used in Table 8A are used 
here. Social security contributions are defined as logarithms of the fraction of the contribution rate, that is 
we use ln(1+SS). Standard errors are in parentheses. The other three rows are obtained from the formula in 
the text, using alternative values of α, as shown in the first column of the table. When estimated effects on 
wages are positive, they are constrained to be zero. ** Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
Adv. Notice 
(AN)  
14.08 13.755  1.184  -9.090 -9.195 17.297 
  (15.629)  (14.564) (14.721) (11.011)  (10.617) (11.379) 
Indem Dismissal   1.286  -2.577  0.087  0.470  3.005  0.742 
(ID) (0.979)  (1.196)
* (1.702) (1.001)  (1.008)
** (1.089) 
Seniority Pay   3.480  0.000  1.624  0.739  N.A.  1.247 
(SenP) (1.305)
* (0.000)  (2.299)  (1.332)    (1.406) 







*Reform -0.138 0.000 -0.327 0.124 0.000  0.248 
 (0.072)  (0.000)  (0.134)
* (0.044)
** (0.000)  (0.109)
* 
Reform 7.290  0.000  10.665  -4.349  0.000  -7.234 
 (3.174)
* (0.000)  (4.765)
* (1.926)
* (0.000)  (3.758) 
GDP growth  0.096  0.034  0.123  -0.164  -0.130  -0.239 




Log GDP pc  2.348  1.828  10.742  -2.336  -2.700  4.983 
  (1.227) (1.334)  (7.643)  (1.236) (1.355)  (3.292) 
% WAP 25-54  15.011  12.112  34.692  20.505  25.196  -93.257 
 (16.884)  (19.197)  (69.954)  (14.199)  (16.442)  (34.205)
* 
% WAP 55-64  45.690  50.009  -449.346  -2.593  -7.975  365.975 
  (35.828) (35.553) (298.027) (28.761) (31.360) (223.294) 
Constant 15.044  8.519  1.087  20.739  28.443  -49.617 
  (17.348)  (31.305) (52.262) (12.965)  (23.305) (36.657) 
N  417 329  88  416 328  88 
R
2  0.92 0.93  0.84  0.84 0.86  0.76 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. See Appendix A.1 for a definition of Reform variable. * significant at 5% level; ** significant 
at 1% level. N.A. = not applicable. WAP denotes Working Age Population 
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Table 12: Random Effect Estimates  
  Emp.  Emp.  Emp.  Unemp. Unemp. Unemp. 
 Total 
Sample 
OECD LAC  Total   
Sample 
OECD LAC 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Advance   4.142  5.292  1.417 -2.762 -3.560 -0.200 
Notice  (AN)  (1.871)* (1.986)**  (4.461) (1.278)* (1.733)* (1.997) 
          
Indemnities    -0.250  -1.010  -0.358  0.027 0.326 -0.048 
Diss.  (ID) (0.347) (0.809)  (0.464)  (0.266) (0.706) (0.298) 
          
Seniority  Pay  0.899 0.000  0.562  -0.074  0.000 0.009 
(SenP)  (0.331)**  (0.000)  (0.438)  (0.225) (0.000) (0.202) 
          
Soc.  Sec.  -0.221  -0.259  -0.164  0.135 0.153 0.090 
Contrib.(SSC)    (0.031)** (0.032)**  (0.073)* (0.023)** (0.029)** (0.050) 
          
Growth of   0.089  0.030  0.123  -0.157  -0.133  -0.205 
GPD  (0.046)  (0.051)  (0.097)  (0.038)** (0.047)** (0.068)** 
          
Log GDP per   2.292  1.837  8.931  -2.117  -2.606  1.607 
Capita    (PPP)  (0.826)** (0.784)*  (3.251)**  (0.668)** (0.705)** (1.869) 
          
Share of 
WAP  
17.462 8.760  21.529  21.471 26.494 -11.405 
25-54  (10.657) (10.682)  (37.575)  (8.598)* (9.616)**  (22.081) 
          
Share of 
WAP   
48.130  34.748  -76.504  1.544 2.022 21.309 
55-64 (20.842)*  (21.002)  (75.751)  (16.411) (18.910) (40.005) 
          
Constant  18.202 31.222  -19.363  12.749 13.938 -3.868 
  (6.616)**  (6.896)**  (15.833)  (5.169)* (6.160)* (9.823) 
          
















2  0.46 0.48  0.004  0.15 0.14 0.26 
Standard errors in parentheses. WAP denotes Working Age Population. Columns (1) and (4) include a  
dummy variable that identifies the region, and which takes the value equal to 1 if the country is in Latin America 
and zero otherwise.  * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level.   115
 
Table 13: Correlation between Dependency Ratio 







Dependency 112.10  102.38  283.6 









Observations 514  411  86 
R-squared 0.09  0.09  0.46 
Dependency ratio computed as the ratio of the population 65 and older 
to the working age population (15-64). Robust standard errors in 
parentheses; *significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level.  
 













Advance  Notice  26.66 23.77 30.77 -15.72  -15.10  -12.73 
  (16.26) (13.51) (24.61) (11.29)  (10.01)  (19.86) 
Indemnities    -1.08 -7.15 2.33  1.73  5.80  -1.64 
Dismissal  (2.31) (2.38)**  (3.71) (1.68)  (1.94)** (2.29) 
Seniority  Pay  -0.41  0.00 5.10 2.81  0.00  -2.55 
  (3.56) (0.00) (5.42) (2.50)  (0.00)  (3.22) 






†  (0.38) 
Observations  404 321 83  404  321  83 
R-squared  0.70 0.79 0.70 0.67  0.74  0.33 
All regressions include country fixed effects as well as GDP pc (PPP adjusted), GDP growth, and the share of workers in 
WAP between 25 and 54 and 55 and 64. We instrument Social Security Contributions (measures in EPV) with the 
dependency ratio, computed as the ratio of the population 65 and older to the working age population (15-64). Robust 




























































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Minimum Wage/Mean Wage in OECD Countries* and in Latin America** 
 
Figures and Tables 
1Maloney and Nunez
                                                 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Exp. Disc. Soc. Sec. Cont. as Multiples of Monthly Wages/Quadratic Prediction
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